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Abstract  
We study the dual role of active labour market policies: First, ALMP may 
perform a screening role by increasing the incentives for job search especially 
among individuals with good labour market prospects, already prior to 
programme participation. Second, actual programme participation may help 
individuals with poor labour market prospects. We examine whether this type of 
a pattern can be found in individual responses to a major nationwide youth 
activation programme in Sweden. We analyse individual responses to the 
programme using an RD design. We find that individuals with a high predicted 
probability of finding work respond to the threat of activation, whereas there is 
no effect for individuals with weak labour market prospects. 
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1 Introduction	
We	examine	empirically	whether	activation	of	the	unemployed	affects	job	finding	rates	mainly	
through	helping	those	with	otherwise	poor	labour	market	prospects	to	find	work,	or	through	
persuading	 individuals	 with	 generally	 good	 labour	 market	 prospects	 to	 search	 more	
intensively	for	a	job.	The	latter	phenomenon	would	indicate	the	presence	of	a	screening	role	
of	 active	 labour	market	 programmes,	 similar	 to	 a	 screening	 effect	 of	workfare	 discussed	 in	
theoretical	work	initially	in	the	context	of	poverty	alleviation;	the	seminal	contribution	here	is	
Besley	 and	 Coate	 (1992).1	 Such	 an	 effect	 is	 related	 to	 the	 so	 called	 threat	 effect	 of	 active	
labour	 market	 programmes	 (e.g.	 Black	 et	 al.	 2003),	 whereby	 individuals	 respond	 to	 the	
presence	of	a	programme	already	prior	 to	actual	participation.	However,	 in	 the	presence	of	
screening,	 the	 threat	 effect	 is	 heterogeneous	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 affects	 precisely	 those	
individuals	 with	 good	 labour	 market	 prospects.	 Despite	 a	 number	 of	 theoretical	 papers	
analysing	the	screening	role	of	workfare,	direct	empirical	evidence	remains	limited.		
We	 analyse	 the	 pattern	 of	 individual	 responses	 to	 a	major,	 nationwide	 youth	 activation	
programme	 (the	 Youth	 Job	 Guarantee)	 that	 was	 introduced	 in	 Sweden	 in	 2007.	 The	 main	
focus	 of	 the	 programme	was	 in	 activities	 related	 to	 job	 search.	We	 use	 data	 on	 the	 entire	
Swedish	 population	 and	 covering	 the	 universe	 of	 unemployment	 spells	 during	 the	 period	
under	study.	Before	turning	to	the	empirical	analysis,	we	 illustrate	how	the	screening	effect	
may	 arise	 in	 a	 search	 theory	 framework	 where	 individuals	 differ	 in	 their	 labour	 market	
prospects.		
Another	distinguishing	 feature	of	our	analysis	 is	 that	 in	 looking	at	 the	screening	role	and	
heterogeneous	 effects	 of	 activation,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 focus	 on	 a	 particularly	 rich	 set	 of	
background	variables.	In	particular,	in	addition	to	more	traditional	background	variables	such	
as	education	and	immigrant	status,	we	have	exceptionally	good	data	on	the	individuals’	past	
health	 and	 labour	 market	 history.	 The	 use	 of	 health	 data	 is	 motivated	 by	 the	 finding	 that	
individuals	with	poor	past	health	–	especially	 those	with	past	mental	health	problems	–	are	
hugely	overrepresented	among	individuals	with	poor	labour	market	prospects.		
In	 looking	 at	 the	 heterogeneous	 effects	 of	 the	 programme,	 we	 first	 classify	 individuals	
according	 to	 their	 predicted	 probability	 of	 finding	work.	We	 do	 this	 by	 using	 an	 empirical	
model	estimated	on	out‐of‐sample	data	(i.e.	data	on	unemployment	spells	in	the	year	prior	to	
the	introduction	of	the	programme).	This	simple	approach	avoids	the	problem	of	endogenous	
stratification	 that	 has	 been	 present	 in	 some	 earlier	 studies,	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	Abadie	 et	 al.	
(2016).	 Individuals	 with	 a	 relatively	 high	 predicted	 probability	 of	 finding	 work	 are	 then	
                                                 
1	We	discuss	related	literature	more	extensively	in	Section	2.	
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classified	as	being	in	a	relatively	strong	labour	market	position,	and	therefore	more	likely	to	
be	 voluntarily	 unemployed.	We	 use	 a	 regression	 discontinuity	 (RD)	 design	 to	 estimate	 the	
effects	of	the	Youth	Job	Guarantee	programme	(YJG),	using	the	fact	that	only	individuals	under	
25	years	of	age	are	eligible	 for	 the	programme.	Under	25‐year‐olds	are	eligible	 if	 they	have	
been	 unemployed	 for	 more	 than	 90	 days.	 Thus,	 our	 empirical	 strategy	 is	 essentially	 to	
compare	 the	 job	 finding	 rate	among	 individuals	who	have	 just	 turned	25	before	90	days	of	
unemployment	(ineligible)	to	the	job	finding	rate	among	those	who	are	just	below	age	25	at	
90	days	of	unemployment	(eligible).	We	analyse	separately	the	effect	of	programme	eligibility	
on	the	probability	of	finding	employment	during	the	first	90	days	of	the	unemployment	spell	
(the	threat	effect)	as	well	as	at	different	points	in	time	later	on.		
Clearly,	 there	 exists	 a	 large	 earlier	 literature	 on	 evaluating	 active	 labour	 market	
programmes,	 see	 e.g.	 Card	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 and	 Kluve	 (2010)	 for	 reviews.	 The	 most	 relevant	
studies	for	our	paper	are	reviewed	in	Section	2.	We	contribute	to	this	literature	in	a	number	of	
ways.	 First,	 we	 provide	 evidence	 on	 the	 screening	 role	 of	 activation	 programmes	 through	
examining	 how	 the	 effects	 of	 activation	 differ	 with	 respect	 to	 individuals’	 labour	 market	
prospects.	 While	 there	 are	 numerous	 theoretical	 papers	 on	 the	 screening	 effect	 of	
workfare/ALMP	in	different	types	of	settings,	we	are	not	aware	of	earlier	empirical	evidence	
focussing	 directly	 on	 this	 issue.	We	 study	whether	 the	 pattern	 of	 exit	 (both	 regarding	 the	
timing	 as	well	 as	 heterogeneity	 across	 individuals)	 from	unemployment	 in	 response	 to	 the	
introduction	of	an	activation	programme	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	ALMP	screens	away	
from	 unemployment	 those	 individuals	 whom	 we	 would	 predict	 to	 have	 a	 good	 chance	 of	
finding	a	job	even	in	the	absence	of	activation.	We	also	provide	a	brief	conceptual	framework	
that	 illustrates	 how	 the	 screening	 effect	may	 arise	 in	 a	 labour	market	 search	model	where	
individuals	 differ	 in	 their	 baseline	 probabilities	 of	 finding	work.	 As	we	 argue	 in	 Section	 2,	
previous	 theoretical	 applications	 do	 not	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 screening	 in	 the	 context	 of	
transitions	 from	 unemployment	 to	 work.	 Second,	 only	 a	 few	 studies	 examine	 whether	
activation	 programmes	 have	 had	 different	 impacts	 among	 the	 disadvantaged	 youth.	
Disadvantaged	youth	are	an	 important	group	to	 look	at,	 since	preventing	social	exclusion	 is	
often	a	key	motivation	behind	programmes	targeted	at	youth.	In	all	of	the	previous	literature	
we	know	of,	disadvantageousness	is	proxied	by	educational	status,	whereas	we	use	a	rich	set	
of	background	information	with	extensive	knowledge	of	individuals’	past	employment	history	
and	health.	Finally,	one	of	the	conclusions	in	Kluve	(2010)	is	that	youth	training	programmes	
have	a	 relatively	 low	probability	of	 showing	positive	 effects,	 and	 it	 is	 of	 interest	 in	 itself	 to	
2
  
evaluate	whether	the	large,	nationwide	Swedish	activation	programme	yields	more	promising	
outcomes.	
Our	 results	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 statistically	 significant	 threat	 effect	 associated	with	 the	
programme:	Programme	eligibility	increases	the	probability	of	finding	employment	before	the	
programme	 starts	 by	 around	 7	 percent.	 Our	 results	 also	 indicate	 that	 the	 threat	 effect	 is	
mainly	driven	by	groups	with	a	more	advantaged	position	in	the	labour	market	–	we	find	no	
statistically	significant	threat	effect	for	the	group	with	the	weakest	labour	market	prospects.	
Moreover,	we	do	not	find	any	long	term	effects	of	the	programme	for	any	group:	after	about	a	
year	 from	 the	 start	 of	 unemployment,	 job	 finding	 rates	 among	 the	 ineligible	 seem	 to	 have	
caught	up	with	that	of	the	eligible.	The	empirical	patterns	that	we	find	are	consistent	with	the	
idea	 that	 the	 programme	 performs	 a	 screening	 role.	 The	 main	 effect	 of	 the	 programme	
appears	to	be	to	screen	away	from	unemployment	those	individuals	who	are	able	to	find	work	
on	 their	 own,	 whereas	 there	 appear	 to	 be	 no	 major	 positive	 effects	 for	 those	 in	 a	 poorer	
labour	market	position.	
The	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 provides	 the	 theoretical	 background	 for	 our	
empirical	analysis,	and	it	also	discusses	earlier	empirical	work	in	the	area.	Section	3	describes	
the	 activation	 programme,	 while	 the	 data	 is	 described	 in	 Section	 4.	 The	 empirical	
methodology	 and	 the	 results	 for	 the	 whole	 sample	 as	 well	 as	 subgroups	 are	 presented	 in	
Section	 5.	We	 also	 conduct	 a	 large	 battery	 of	 RD	 validity	 and	 robustness	 checks.	 Section	 6	
concludes.	
2 Background	and	earlier	literature	
2.1 Theoretical	background	
Besley	and	Coate	(1992)	provided	a	seminal	theoretical	contribution	on	the	screening	role	of	
workfare,	arguing	that	work	requirements	in	poverty	alleviation	programmes	can	function	as	
a	screening	device	between	those	who	are	truly	 in	need	of	poor	support	and	those	who	are	
not.2	The	result	arises	because	high	ability	individuals	have	a	higher	opportunity	cost	of	time	
and	 are	 therefore	 less	willing	 to	 participate	 in	workfare	 programmes.	Kreiner	 and	Tranaes	
(2005)	provide	a	theoretical	analysis	of	the	screening	role	of	workfare	in	the	labour	market	
context,	and	a	similar	model	has	been	studied	in	Fredriksson	and	Holmlund	(2006a).	In	this	
model,	 individuals	who	are	voluntarily	unemployed	(or	“non‐workers”	 in	their	terminology)	
                                                 
2	Cuff	(2000)	discusses	the	role	of	workfare	in	screening	between	the	“deserving”	and	“undeserving”	poor	in	a	model	where	
individuals	differ	(in	addition	to	ability)	in	their	disutility	of	work.	
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have	a	 relatively	high	disutility	of	work,	 and	a	work	 requirement	 therefore	makes	 claiming	
unemployment	benefits	a	less	attractive	option	for	them.			
A	key	notion	in	our	analysis	is	that	active	labour	market	programmes	(ALMP)	may	play	a	
similar	screening	role	as	workfare.	The	potential	similarity	between	workfare	and	ALMP	has	
been	 noted	 also	 in	 Fredriksson	 and	 Holmlund	 (2006b).	 We	 take	 on	 board	 the	 idea	 from	
Kreiner	and	Tranaes	(2005),	that	workfare/ALMP	may	be	able	to	screen	between	individuals	
who	are	voluntarily	and	involuntarily	unemployed.	However,	their	framework	is	not	directly	
applicable	 in	 our	 setting:	We	are	 interested	 in	 transitions	 into	 employment.	 In	Kreiner	 and	
Tranaes’	 model,	 screening	 works	 through	 deterring	 non‐workers	 from	 claiming	
unemployment	 benefits	 (pushing	 them	 onto	 minimum	 income	 support	 that	 is	 available	
without	a	work	requirement),	but	it	does	not	directly	affect	employment	rates.	We	would	like	
to	capture	the	idea	that	voluntarily	unemployed	individuals	would	be	able	to	find	work	if	they	
wanted	to	(even	in	the	absence	of	an	activation	programme),	but	do	not	do	so	if	benefits	are	
too	high	or	easy	to	obtain.	
To	be	more	precise,	what	we	mean	by	screening	in	this	context	is	the	following:	Workers	
differ	in	their	in	job	arrival	rates,	 i.e.	returns	to	search.	For	simplicity,	we	assume	that	there	
are	two	types	of	workers,	 low	and	high	types.	Neither	 job‐arrival	rates	nor	search	effort	are	
observable	to	the	policy‐maker,	so	policy	cannot	be	conditioned	on	them.	We	show	below	that	
the	 threat	of	an	activation	policy	 increases	 the	marginal	 return	 to	search	more	 for	 the	high	
type	(with	a	high	job	arrival	rate)	than	the	low	type.	Hence	the	two	types	respond	differently	
to	the	policy,	that	 is,	 the	policy	helps	to	separate	between	the	types:	the	threat	of	activation	
increases	the	incentives	to	search	more	for	the	high	type	with	good	labour	market	prospects,	
and	thus	works	towards	higher	increases	in	exit	rates	from	unemployment	by	the	high	type	
already	prior	to	the	actual	activation	phase.	In	this	sense	the	policy	helps	to	deter	in	particular	
the	high	 type	 from	unemployment.3	While	 it	appears	plausible	 that	 it	would	be	a	good	 idea	
also	in	practice	to	induce	those	with	higher	returns	to	search	to	exert	more	search	effort	(the	
model	features	no	differences	in	search	costs),	a	caveat	is	that	we	do	not	provide	an	explicit	
analysis	 of	 the	 welfare	 properties	 of	 the	 programme.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	
possibility	to	use	activation	as	an	(optimal)	screening	device	hinges	on	whether	the	policy	is	
                                                 
3 Note that the high type individuals will	naturally	exit	unemployment	sooner	than	the	 low	type	 individuals,	ceteris	paribus,	
even	 in	 the	absence	of	activation.	What	we	are	 interested	 in,	however,	 is	how	an	activation	programme	affects	 the	search	
behaviour	of	different	types	of	workers,	i.e.	whether	changes	in	exit	rates	from	unemployment	after	the	introduction	of	the	
policy	differ	across	types. 
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able	 to	 separate	 different	 types	 of	 individuals.	 We	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 illustration	 and	
empirical	evidence	on	such	heterogeneous	responses.4	
To	 illustrate	 this	 idea	 in	 a	 simple	 setting,	 we	 extend	 the	 work	 by	 Andersen	 and	 Svarer	
(2014),	who	study	the	role	of	workfare	in	a	conventional	search‐theoretic	model	with	moral	
hazard,	 to	 a	 situation	where	workers	 are	 heterogeneous.	 	 Andersen	 and	 Svarer	 consider	 a	
model	where	the	unemployed	face	a	certain	probability	of	being	required	to	participate	in	a	
workfare	programme.	This	probability	 is	denoted	by	݌௔௨.	We	analyse	how	different	types	of	
job‐seekers	react	to	changes	in	the	activation	intensity	(݈௔),	that	is,	the	time	they	are	required	
to	 participate	 in	 activation	 (conditional	 on	 being	 assigned	 to	 a	 programme).	 In	 this	model,	
workfare	is	assumed	to	be	useless	per	se,	i.e.	it	does	not	affect	workers’	productivities	or	job‐
arrival	rates.	This	assumption	is	common	also	in	other	related	literature,	and	we	adopt	it	 in	
our	main	analysis,	but	we	also	comment	below	on	the	 	case	where	workfare	(or	activation)	
may	have	a	beneficial	effect	on	the	likelihood	of	finding	a	new	job.	
Workers’	 instantaneous	 utility,	 ݄,	 depends	 on	 consumption	 (=disposable	 income),		
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ,	where	τ	is	the	tax	rate	and	ݓ	is	income	in	employement,	and	on	leisure.	The	utility	
for	the	individual	when	at	work	is	then	݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ, 1 െ ݈௘൯,	where	݈௘	depicts	working	hours.	
When	 unemployed,	 utility	 is	 ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௨൯,	 with	 ݏ௨	 denoting	 search	 intensity	 and	 ܾ	
denotes	income	when	unemployed.	The	utility	when	the	individual	is	required	to	participate	
in	 workfare	 is	 ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௔ െ ݈௔൯.	 Income	 b	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	 same	 for	 the	
unemployed	irrespective	or	their	activation	status.		
The	value	functions	(with	ρ	denoting	the	interest	rate)	are		
	
(1) ߩܸா ൌ ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ, 1 െ ݈௘൯ ൅ ݌௨௘ሾܸ௎ െ ܸாሿ,		
(2) ߩܸ௎ ൌ ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௨൯ ൅ ߙ௜ݏ௨ሾܸா െ ܸ௎ሿ ൅ ݌௔௨ሾܸ஺ െ ܸ௎ሿ,	
(3) ߩܸ஺ ൌ ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௔ െ ݈௔൯ ൅ ߙ௜ݏ௔ሾܸா െ ܸ஺ሿ.	
	
In	 the	 above	 expressions,	 ߙ௜ݏ௨	 and	 ߙ௜ݏ௔	are	 the	 probabilities	 of	 getting	 a	 job	 for	 the	
unemployed	of	type	i	with	or	without	workfare,	respectively.	The	probability	of	losing	a	job	is	
݌௨௘.	The	job	arrival	rate	conditional	on	search	effort	for	individual	i	is	denoted	by	ߙ௜	(whose	
value	will	be	varied	below).	We	assume	that	there	are	two	groups	of	individuals,	who	differ	in	
                                                 
4 For	example	in	Fredriksson	and	Holmlund	(2006a),	workfare	achieves	perfect	screening	between	non‐workers	and	workers	
(i.e.	only	workers	claim	unemployment	insurance	benefits),	but	it	may	still	not	be	optimal	policy	as	other	policy	instruments	
yield	higher	welfare.	In	our	case,	activation	increases	the	benefits	of	search	for	both	types,	but	more	so	for	the	high	type;	in	
this	sense,	screening	is	less	than	perfect.	Another	example	of	imperfect	screening,	albeit	from	a	very	different	context,	arises	
in	optimal	tax	models	where	workers	with	different	abilities	choose	different	levels	of	work	hours.	 
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their	job‐finding	rate,	such	that	ߙଶ ൐ ߙଵ		The	groups	are	large	in	the	sense	that	ߙ௜	is	taken	as	
given	 by	 each	 individual,	 i.e.	 it	 is	 a	 macro	 variable	 that	 is	 determined	 in	 the	 model.	 The	
differences	 in	 job‐finding	 probabilities	may	 reflect	 differences	 in	 skills	 or	 personality	 traits	
across	the	groups.	Of	course,	if	the	labour	market	were	perfectly	competitive,	such	differences	
should	be	reflected	in	wage	levels.	On	the	other	hand,	in	reality	there	may	be	reasons	why	an	
employer	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 tailor	 wage	 offers	 fully	 to	 the	 personal	 characteristics	 of	 job	
candidates,	which	would	show	up	as	differences	in	the	likelihood	of	receiving	job	offers.5		
How	 does	 search	 effort	 for	 the	 unemployed	 change	 when	 activation	 intensity	 (݈௔)	
increases?	And	how	does	the	change	depend	on	the	job‐finding	rate	–	i.e.	does	more	intense	
activation	increase	the	benefits	of	search	more	for	the	high	type	(type	2)?		
Denote	the	marginal	benefit	of	search	while	in	open	unemployment	by	ܤ௎ ൌ ߙ௜ሾܸா െ ܸ௎ሿ.		
It	is	shown	in	Appendix	A	that		డ஻ೆడ௟ೌ ൐ 0.	That	is,	as	one	would	expect,	the	marginal	benefit	of	
search	is	increasing	in	the	intensity	of	activation.	Further,	we	have	that		 డ஻ೆడ௟ೌడఈ ൐ 0	:	increasing	
the	intensity	of	activation	increases	the	benefits	of	search	more	for	the	high	type.	Note	that	we	
have	assumed	that	the	two	types	do	not	differ	in	their	valuation	of	leisure	(i.e.	the	function	h	is	
the	same	for	both	types).	Therefore	the	mechanism	at	play	in	our	setting	is	different	to	that	in	
Kreiner	and	Tranaes,	who	have	examined	the	screening	role	of	workfare	when	agents	differ	in	
their	 valuation	 for	 leisure.	 In	 our	 setting,	 screening	 can	 arise	 in	 the	 labour	market	 context	
even	with	identical	preferences	for	leisure.		
Turning	to	effects	that	occur	during	the	activation	phase	 itself	and	denoting	the	marginal	
benefits	 of	 search	 in	 the	 activation	phase	by	ܤ஺,	we	 show	 in	Appendix	A	 that	 	 డ஻ಲడ௟ೌ ൐ 0	and		
డ஻ಲ
డ௟ೌడఈ ൐ 0.	Increasing	the	intensity	of	activation	again	increases	the	benefits	of	search	more	for	
the	high	type.	This	result	holds	in	the	simple	setting	where	we	have	assumed	that	activation	is	
unproductive	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 has	 no	 direct	 effect	 on	 the	 job	 finding	 probability.	 This	
assumption	 is	 in	 line	 with	 earlier	 literature,	 which	 has	 concentrated	 on	 examining	 the	
conditions	under	which	unproductive	workfare	is	desirable.	If	on	the	other	hand	we	allowed	
for	the	quite	realistic	possibility	that	activation	could	increase	the	job	arrival	rate,	and	more	
so	 for	 the	 low	type,	 then	the	second	result	above	could	be	overturned	 i.e.	 it	 is	possible	 that	
activation	would	 increase	 the	 benefit	 of	 search	more	 for	 the	 low	 type.	 To	 keep	 the	model	
tractable,	we	have	not	analyzed	this	case	formally.	
                                                 
5 Hall (2005) discusses sticky wages as a reason behind aggregate fluctuations in firm recruitment effort and job-finding rates. We 
conjecture that a similar mechanism might explain variation in job-finding probabilities within the population. 
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In	this	setting,	active	labour	market	policies	may	then	work	through	two	channels:	(i)	the	
threat	of	activation	works	towards	deterring	from	unemployment	especially	those	individuals	
who	would	be	able	to	 find	work	on	their	own	but	do	not	do	so	e.g.	because	benefits	are	too	
generous	 or	 easy	 to	 obtain	 (type	 2);	 this	 is	 the	 screening	 effect;	 and	 (ii)	 participation	 in	
activation	itself	also	 increases	 job‐finding	rates;	call	 this	 the	activation	effect6.	 If	workfare	 is	
productive	in	the	sense	that	it	increases	job‐finding	rates,	and	more	so	for	individuals	who	are	
less	likely	to	find	work	on	their	own	(type	1),	participation	in	activation	may	help	especially	
these	types	of	individuals	to	find	a	job.	If	both	screening	and	activation	effects	are	at	work,	we	
would	 expect	 to	 observe	 a	 certain	 type	 of	 pattern	 in	 exit	 from	 unemployment:	 Type	 2	
individuals	would	 exit	 unemployment	 predominantly	 before	 actual	 activation	 starts,	 i.e.	we	
would	observe	a	 threat	effect	 for	type	2	 individuals.7	Type	1	 individuals,	on	the	other	hand,	
would	enter	 the	activation	phase,	and	may	 find	employment	as	a	 result.	We	aim	 to	analyse	
whether	such	patterns	are	present	 in	our	data.	 In	 the	empirical	application,	 in	 line	with	 the	
above	 framework,	 we	 use	 the	 predicted	 probability	 of	 finding	 work	 (in	 the	 absence	 of	
activation)	 as	 a	 measure	 to	 distinguish	 between	 type	 1	 and	 2	 individuals:	 if	 the	 person	
remains	 unemployed	 despite	 a	 high	 predicted	 probability	 (based	 on	 observable	
characteristics)	of	finding	work,	unemployment	is	more	likely	to	be	voluntary.	
2.2 Previous	empirical	literature	
Related	 to	 our	 focus	 on	 the	 screening	 role	 of	 workfare/ALMP,	 Fredriksson	 and	 Holmlund	
(2006)	note	that	empirical	evidence	on	the	effects	of	workfare	is	limited,	with	papers	on	the	
threat	effect	of	ALMP	providing	the	most	closely	related	evidence.	A	number	of	studies	have	
documented	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 threat	 effect	 in	 the	 context	 of	 activation	 programmes.	 For	
instance,	 Black	 et	 al.	 (2003)	 find	 that	 unemployed	 workers	 react	 to	 the	 notification	 of	 an	
activation	requirement	in	a	US‐based	study.	Using	Danish	data,	Geerdsen	(2006)	shows	that	
the	exit	rate	from	unemployment	increases	as	individuals	approach	compulsory	programme	
participation;	and	Rosholm	and	Svarer	(2008)	find	that	individuals	react	to	a	perceived	risk	of	
future	 programme	 participation.	 Threat	 effects	 have	 also	 been	 detected	 in	 the	 Swedish	
context	by	Hägglund	(2011),	who	studied	a	pilot	programme	in	three	municipalities,	and	by	
Carling	 and	 Larsson	 (2005)	 and	 Forslund	 and	 Skans	 (2006),	 who	 studied	 an	 earlier	 youth	
activation	programme.	However	as	argued	above,	to	provide	evidence	of	screening,	we	should	
                                                 
6	Besley	and	Coate	(1992)	discuss	the	deterrent	effect	of	workfare,	which	relates	to	encouraging	poverty‐reducing	investment.	
Participation	 in	activation	can	also	be	 seen	as	an	 investment	 that	helps	 the	 individual	 find	a	 job	 later	on;	however,	 in	our	
context	this	should	not	be	seen	as	a	deterrent	effect	to	the	extent	that	unemployment	is	involuntary.		
7	 If	people	also	differed	with	respect	to	the	discount	rate,	 it	could	well	be	the	case	that	people	with	a	high	 job‐finding	rate	
discount	 future	 less;	 a	 situation	 that	 would	 further	 strengthen	 the	 pattern.	 DellaVigna	 and	 Paserman	 (2005)	 study	 the	
relationship	between	patience	and	job	search	effort,	but	they	do	not	consider	the	role	of	activation.	 
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find	a	pattern	where	the	threat	effect	is	heterogeneous	such	that	individuals	with	good	labour	
market	prospects	react	to	the	threat	of	activation.	While	earlier	examinations	of	threat	effects	
have	not	focused	on	distinguishing	between	different	types	of	workers,	we	use	the	predicted	
probability	of	finding	work	(in	the	absence	of	activation)	as	a	proxy	for	an	individual’s	labour	
market	 prospects	 and	 analyse	 whether	 the	 pattern	 of	 exit	 (both	 regarding	 the	 timing	 and	
heterogeneity	 across	 individuals)	 from	 unemployment	 after	 the	 introduction	 of	 activation	
supports	the	idea	that	there	may	be	a	screening	role	for	ALMP.8		
Let	 us	 next	 turn	 to	 papers	 that	 have	 examined	 whether	 activation	 programmes	 have	
different	 impacts	 among	 disadvantaged	 youth.	 There	 are	 only	 a	 few	 such	 papers,	 and	 they	
generally	 use	 low	 education	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 being	 disadvantaged.	 Caliendo	 et	 al.	 (2011)	
evaluate	 a	 number	 of	 programmes	 in	 Germany	 and	 find	 persistently	 positive	 employment	
effects	 that	 are	 stronger	 for	 those	with	 better	 education.	Maibom	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 evaluates	 a	
randomised	field	experiment	conducted	in	Denmark.	The	treated	 job	seekers	received	more	
intensive	support	from	caseworkers	and	mentors,	and	this	was	combined	with	other	policies.	
They	find	that	the	treatment	effect	varies	depending	on	the	individual’s	education	level,	with	
no	 impact	 for	 those	with	basic	education	only.	Finally,	Hämäläinen	et	 al.	 (2014)	provide	an	
impact	 evaluation	 of	 a	 Finnish	 activation	 programme	 similar	 to	 the	 Swedish	 one	 that	 we	
analyse,	also	targeted	at	youth.	They	find	that	the	policy	had	positive	but	modest	employment	
effects,	and	the	effects	are	again	concentrated	to	those	with	better	education.9		
Our	 paper	 is	 also	 related	 to	 literature	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 health	 and	
unemployment.	 There	 is	 a	 large	 literature	 on	 this	 topic	 (see	 e.g.	 Eliason	 and	 Storrie	 2009;	
Browning	and	Meinesen	2012)	and	we	will	not	attempt	to	summarise	it	here.	The	focus	in	the	
present	paper	is	not	on	the	association	between	health	and	unemployment	per	se.	Rather,	we	
ask	 whether	 individuals	 with	 different	 health	 statuses	 (among	 other	 characteristics)	 react	
differently	 to	activation	policies.	A	 related	earlier	paper	 is	Nordberg	 (2008),	who	 finds	 that	
individual	health	status	affects	the	transition	from	vocational	rehabilitation	to	work.		
As	elaborated	in	the	Introduction,	we	contribute	to	the	literature	by	providing	evidence	on	
the	screening	role	of	labour	market	programmes	and	by	analysing	whether	the	programmes	
are	effective	 in	helping	the	disadvantaged	youth,	using	exceptionally	rich	data	on	 individual	
background	characteristics	that	may	be	related	to	one’s	position	in	the	labour	market.	We	do	
                                                 
8	Rosholm	and	Svarer	(2008)	find	that	there	is	a	strong	threat	effect	from	active	labour	market	policies,	but	not	for	the	long‐
term	unemployed;	this	may	be	related	to	the	notion	of	individuals	in	a	poor	labour	market	position	not	reacting	to	the	threat	
of	activation.	
9	Hämäläinen	et	al.	(2014)	are	also	interested	in	the	health	of	job‐seekers.	The	difference	is	that	they	use	subsequent	mental	
health	as	an	additional	outcome	variable,	whereas	we	concentrate	on	heterogeneous	treatment	impacts. 
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so	not	 in	the	context	of	small	pilot	 initiatives,	but	based	on	a	country‐wide	major	activation	
programme.		
3 The	youth	activation	programme	
The	activation	programme	we	study	is	the	Youth	Job	Guarantee	(YJG)	that	started	in	Sweden	
in	December	2007.	The	programme	involves	activation	that	starts	90	days	after	a	person	has	
registered	as	an	unemployed	jobseeker	at	the	public	employment	service,	and	it	 involves	all	
unemployed	individuals	who	are	under	25	years	of	age.	That	is,	all	individuals	who	have	not	
yet	 turned	 25	 should	 be	 assigned	 after	 90	 days	 of	 unemployment.10	 The	 activation	 is	
mandatory	 for	 those	 in	 the	 targeted	 age	 group,	 and	 a	 refusal	 to	 participate	 could	 incur	
sanctions	 in	 the	 form	 of	 withdrawn	 unemployment	 or	 welfare	 benefits.	 If	 assigned	 to	 the	
programme,	the	individual	needs	to	participate	until	he/she	finds	a	job	or	enrols	in	education,	
i.e.	individuals	who	are	already	in	the	programme	are	not	allowed	to	drop	out	when	they	turn	
25.11			
Figure	112	 illustrates	the	structure	of	the	programme.	The	first	three	months	(90	days)	of	
an	unemployment	spell	consists	of	open	unemployment.	After	90	days,	the	employment	office	
undertakes	an	in‐depth	assessment	of	the	situation	of	the	individuals	 in	the	target	group.	In	
the	first	phase	of	activation	that	starts	after	90	days,	the	programme	mainly	takes	the	form	of	
job	 search	assistance.	After	a	 further	90	days,	 the	 individuals	who	are	 still	unemployed	are	
transferred	 into	 a	 second	 phase	 of	 activation	 that,	 on	 top	 of	 job	 search	 activities,	 also	 can	
involve	 short	 periods	 of	 training	 or	 work	 placement	 to	 gain	 work	 experience.	 The	 motive	
behind	the	clear	focus	on	job	search	assistance	throughout	the	programme	is	to	avoid	the	kind	
of	lock‐in	effects	that	were	shown	to	occur	in	previous	youth	programmes	(Government	Bill	
2009/10:1).13	 The	 content	 of	 the	 programme	 is	 relatively	 flexible	 and	 should	 be	 tailored	
according	to	individual	needs.	
The	 activities	 within	 the	 YJG	 programme	 are	 supposed	 to	 imply	 full‐time	 participation.	
However,	 based	on	 a	 survey	 among	participants	 in	2009,	Martinsson	 and	Sibbmark	 (2014)	
                                                 
10	Some	rules	of	the	programme	have	changed	over	time.	We	describe	the	rules	in	place	during	the	time	period	we	study,	i.e.	
until	February	2010.	
11	 The	 maximum	 duration	 in	 the	 programme	 is	 15	 months.	 Individuals	 who	 are	 still	 unemployed	 after	 15	 months	 are	
transferred	 to	 another	 activation	 programme	 (the	 Job	 and	 Development	 Guarantee),	 which	 is	 aimed	 at	 long‐term	
unemployed	of	all	ages.	
12	All	figures	and	tables	are	at	the	end	of	the	paper. 
13	Until	 the	end	of	2006,	unemployed	youth	were	assigned	to	activities	organised	by	the	municipalities	(mainly	training	or	
work	placement)	within	the	programmes	Youth	Guarantee	(20─24‐year‐olds)	and	the	Muncipality	Youth	Programme	(18‐19	
year	olds);	see	Carling	and	Larsson	(2005)	and	Forslund	and	Nordström	Skans	(2006)	for	evaluations	of	the	previous	youth	
programmes. 
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conclude	that	this	ambition	is	rarely	met	in	practice.	On	average	the	participants	reported	that	
they	spent	14	hours	per	week	applying	for	jobs	and	participating	in	activities.		
A	further	feature	of	the	reform	is	that	for	some	(well‐defined)	groups	of	unemployed,	the	
unemployment	benefit	declines	faster	over	time	than	it	had	done	prior	to	the	reform.	During	
the	time	period	we	study,	the	earnings	related	unemployment	benefit	was	normally	80	%	of	
prior	earnings	for	the	first	200	days	of	unemployment,	and	declined	to	70	%	for	the	next	100	
days.	 For	 some	 individuals	 participating	 in	 the	 Youth	 Job	 Guarantee	 programme,	 the	 rules	
were	 different:	 the	 80	 %	 replacement	 rate	 applied	 only	 for	 the	 first	 100	 days	 of	
unemployment,	 declined	 to	 70	%	 for	 days	 101‐200	 and	 further	 to	 65%	 for	 days	 201‐300.	
Therefore,	for	some	individuals,	the	reform	involved	elements	of	both	activation	and	financial	
incentives.	However,	the	individual	was	unaffected	by	the	faster	reduction	of	benefits	if	she	(i)	
had	 children;	 or	 (ii)	 was	 only	 eligible	 for	 the	 basic	 unemployment	 benefit;	 or	 (iii)	 had	 an	
earnings	related	benefit	that	would	have	exceeded	the	maximum	amount	of	benefits	(SEK	680		
EUR	68	per	day).		
4 Data	
We	 combine	 data	 on	 individual’s	 employment	 status	 with	 information	 on	 their	 education,	
(past)	health	and	other	 relevant	personal	 characteristics.	The	data	on	unemployment	spells	
come	from	the	register	of	the	Public	Employment	Service	(PES),	and	the	data	on	health	status	
from	hospital	and	drug	registers	provided	by	the	National	Board	of	Health	and	Welfare.	The	
latter	include	yearly	individual‐level	information	on	all	purchases	of	prescribed	medicine,	all	
inpatient	medical	contacts14	and	all	outpatient	medical	contacts	 in	 the	specialised	care.15	To	
these	 registers	 we	 have	 also	 added	 a	 number	 of	 demographic	 variables	 from	 Statistics	
Sweden,	 information	 on	 unemployment	 benefit	 uptake	 from	 the	 Unemployment	 Insurance	
Funds,	 and	 information	 on	 sickness	 benefits	 as	 well	 as	 activity	 compensation	 (disability	
pension)16	uptake	from	the	National	Social	Insurance	Board.		
Our	 data	 cover	 the	 entire	 Swedish	 population,	 and	 we	 can	 observe	 all	 unemployment	
periods	from	1991	to	24th	of	February	2010.	The	YJG	programme	was	introduced	in	December	
2007,	and	we	analyse	its	effects	in	2008	and	2009.17	Our	2008	sample	includes	all	individuals	
aged	 19‐29,	 who	 became	 unemployed	 between	 October	 2007	 and	 September	 2008,	 and	
                                                 
14	Refers	to	cases	where	the	individual	has	been	admitted	to	a	hospital.	In	general	this	means	that	an	overnight	stay	has	been	
required.	
15 The	hospital	registers	cover	both	public	and	privately	operated	health	care	and	include	ICD‐codes	for	diagnoses. 
16	Individuals	below	age	30	are	entitled	to	financial	support	if	they	are	unable	to	work	due	to	their	functional	impairment	for	
at	least	a	year.		
17	Combined	health	and	labour	market	data	are	only	available	for	these	years.		
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therefore	became	eligible	 for	 the	programme	between	 January	2008	and	December	2008,	 if	
they	 were	 still	 unemployed	 and	 below	 25	 years	 of	 age	 at	 that	 time.	 The	 2009	 sample	 is	
constructed	in	the	same	manner,	but	since	the	data	end	in	February	2010,	we	sometimes	need	
to	restrict	the	sampling	period	in	order	to	follow	the	unemployment	spells	long	enough	(e.g.	
when	studying	the	probability	of	finding	employment	within	a	year,	the	sample	is	 limited	to	
spells	beginning	at	least	a	year	before).	All	analyses	below	are	conducted	using	the	combined	
2008‐09	data.	
We	 assume	 that	 a	 person	 has	 found	 a	 job	 if	 she	 has	 left	 the	 PES	 register	 due	 to	
(unsubsidised)	 employment	 or	 has	 been	 registered	 as	 a	 temporary,	 hourly	 or	 part‐time	
employee	for	at	least	one	consecutive	month.18		
Table	1	provides	descriptive	statistics	on	the	background	characteristics	of	the	individuals	
in	the	sample	(excluding	the	health	indicators).	Column	(1)	includes	all	unemployed	19‐	to	29‐
year‐old	individuals;	column	(2)	includes	all	participants	in	the	YJG	programme;	and	columns	
(3)	and	(4)	include	unemployed	persons	within	one	year	from	the	eligibility	cut‐off	age,	that	
is,	 24‐	 and	 25‐year‐old	 individuals,	 respectively.	 The	 25‐year‐olds	 have	 a	 somewhat	 higher	
educational	attainment	and	their	previous	earnings	are	higher	than	those	of	the	24‐year‐olds,	
reflecting	the	fact	that	they	are	older.	In	our	main	analysis	in	Section	5,	we	use	an	RD	design,	
where	the	effects	of	the	YJG	programme	are	identified	from	a	discrete	change	in	programme	
eligibility	 and	 the	 probability	 of	 programme	 assignment	 at	 the	 threshold	 of	 turning	 25.	
Therefore,	what	matters	for	our	analysis	is	whether	there	are	jumps	in	any	of	the	background	
variables	at	the	threshold.	We	examine	this	issue	in	Section	5.3.	
Table	2	provides	descriptive	statistics	for	the	main	health	indicators	used	in	the	analysis.	
One	 difference	 compared	 to	 Table	 1	 is	 that	 column	 (1)	 now	 includes	 all	 other	 Swedish	
residents	 who	 are	 24	 or	 25	 years	 old	 but	 who	 have	 not	 been	 unemployed	 in	 our	 data	
(whereas	 the	 data	 in	 Table	 1	 comes	 from	 the	 registers	 of	 the	 PES	 and	 hence	 includes	 only	
unemployed	individuals).	The	purpose	of	this	change	is	to	provide	a	comparison	of	the	health	
status	 of	 the	 unemployed	 individuals	 relative	 to	 others	 of	 the	 same	 age.	 Unemployed	
individuals	(columns	(3)	and	(4))	appear	to	have	worse	health	than	other	individuals	of	their	
age	(column	(1)).	For	example,	15‐16	percent	of	the	unemployed	24‐	and	25‐year‐olds	used	a	
neurological	drug	the	previous	year	and	9‐10	percent	used	a	drug	for	mental	illness.	Among	
other	 individuals	of	the	same	age,	 these	numbers	are	12	and	7	percent,	respectively.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 the	 individuals	 in	 column	 (2)	 (all	 participants	 in	 the	 YJG	 programme)	 appear	
healthier	than	the	24‐	and	25‐year‐olds	in	our	sample;	this	is	likely	explained	by	the	fact	that	
                                                 
18	In	Section	5.3	we	check	whether	our	results	are	robust	to	an	alternative	definition	of	employment.   
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the	average	 individual	 in	 the	YJG	programme	 is	younger	 than	 those	 in	columns	(3)	and	(4).		
There	are	very	few	differences	between	the	individuals	in	columns	(3)	and	(4).		
Figures	B.1,	B.2	and	B.3	 in	Appendix	B	provide	some	 first	descriptive	analyses	related	 to	
observed	unemployment	duration	in	our	data.	The	graphs	reveal	that	24‐year‐olds	(the	target	
group	of	 the	programme)	have	shorter	unemployment	durations	and	better	re‐employment	
outcomes	than	25‐year‐olds,	when	the	sample	 is	 limited	to	 individuals	who	are	born	during	
the	 same	calendar	year	 (to	achieve	better	 comparability	between	 the	groups).	 	Analyses	by	
differences	in	certain	background	characteristics	show	how	those	with	compulsory	education	
only	 and	 those	 who	 used	 a	 drug	 for	 a	 neurological	 conditions	 the	 previous	 year,	 remain	
unemployed	 longer	 than	more	 highly	 educated	 individuals	 and	 individual	who	 did	 not	 use	
such	drugs.	Later	on	in	the	paper	we	find	that	(past)	mental	health	problems	are	particularly	
strongly	concentrated	among	individuals	with	poor	labour	market	prospects.		
5 Empirical	analysis	
5.1 Empirical	strategy	
We	use	a	regression	discontinuity	design	 to	estimate	 the	effects	of	 the	Youth	 Job	Guarantee	
programme,	using	the	fact	that	only	individuals	who	were	under	25	years	of	age	at	90	days	of	
the	 unemployment	 spell	 were	 eligible	 for	 the	 programme.	 Even	 though	 age	may	 affect	 re‐
employment	 probabilities,	 we	 can	 expect	 individuals	 close	 to	 the	 eligibility	 cut‐off	 to	 be	
similar	 to	each	other	 in	all	other	respects,	except	 that	 individuals	on	one	side	of	 the	cut‐off	
received	the	treatment	(programme	eligibility)	and	individuals	on	the	other	side	did	not.	(The	
balance	of	background	 characteristics	 at	 the	 threshold	 is	 examined	 in	 Section	5.4.1.)	Hence	
any	differences	 in	employment	probability	 that	we	find	between	individuals	on	each	side	of	
the	cut‐off	can	be	attributed	to	the	YJG	programme.	
An	important	point	to	note	is	that	the	assignment	variable	in	our	application	is	not	age	per	
se,	but	age	at	a	particular	date	(90	days	after	entering	unemployment).	Once	assigned	to	the	
programme,	individuals	risked	losing	their	unemployment	benefits	if	they	dropped	out	when	
they	turned	25.	Hence	we	avoid	an	often‐encountered	problem	in	age‐based	RD	analysis,	i.e.	
the	 possibility	 that	 reactions	 of	 individuals	 close	 to	 the	 cut‐off	 age	 would	 be	 affected	 by	
anticipation	of	future	changes	in	treatment	status	when	they	cross	the	age	threshold	(Lee	and	
Lemieux	2010).	Further,	unlike	RD‐type	designs	using	age	as	the	assignment	variable,	in	our	
case	programme	assignment	 is	 stochastic	 (as	 in	 regular	RD):	To	 the	extent	 that	one	 cannot	
fully	 control	 the	 date	 of	 becoming	 unemployed	 –	 in	 particular,	whether	 the	 unemployment	
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spell	 starts	 more	 or	 less	 than	 90	 days	 before	 one’s	 25th	 birthday	 ‐	 then	 programme	
assignment	in	our	application	is	not	deterministic.	
However,	a	potential	threat	to	a	causal	interpretation	of	our	estimates	is	that	the	presence	
of	 the	 programme	 could	 affect	 individuals’	 decision	 to	 register	 at	 the	 PES.	 If	 there	 are	
individuals	with	detailed	knowledge	of	the	programme	and	the	eligibility	requirements	before	
registering	 at	 the	 PES,	 even	 though	 they	 cannot	 fully	 control	 the	 time	 of	 becoming	
unemployed,	 some	of	 them	may	choose	 to	delay	 registration	 in	order	 to	avoid	activation.	 19	
This	would	lead	to	sorting	around	the	eligibility	threshold.20		
Figure	2	shows	the	number	of	individuals	entering	unemployment,	by	age	at	day	90	after	
the	start	of	 the	unemployment	spell	 (where	age	 is	measured	relative	 to	 the	cut‐off	age	25).	
There	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 number	 of	 individuals	 registering	 just	 before	 the	
eligibility	 cut‐off	 or	 of	 a	 spike	 just	 after	 the	 cut‐off.	Hence,	 the	 figure	does	 not	 suggest	 that	
individuals	time	their	registration	in	order	to	avoid	activation.	This	is	also	confirmed	by	the	
McCrary‐test	 (McCrary	 2008),	 which	 does	 not	 detect	 any	 discontinuity	 at	 the	 threshold.21	
(Related	to	 the	subgroup	analysis	 that	we	perform	below,	Figure	C.1	 in	 the	online	appendix	
shows	 that	 there	 is	 no	 sorting	 for	 the	 different	 quartiles	 of	 predicted	 employment	
probabilities	either.)	
	Finally,	 could	 identification	 be	 compromised	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 other	 programmes?	
Sweden	has	a	rich	set	of	training	and	job	search	assistance	programmes	also	for	unemployed	
individuals	 older	 than	 25.	 However,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 YJG,	 programme	
participation	 is	much	more	common	among	unemployed	 individuals	under	25	years	of	age;	
see	 Figure	 3.	 The	 figure	 shows	 that	 the	 likelihood	 of	 participating	 in	 some	 labour	 market	
programme	 increases	 sharply	 for	 24‐year‐olds	 around	 90	 days	 of	 unemployment,	 whereas	
there	is	no	such	pattern	for	25	year‐olds.	This	is	reassuring:	First,	it	indicates	that	we	do	not	
need	 to	worry	about	possible	 confounding	effects	arising	 from	programme	participation	by	
older	job‐seekers.	Second,	the	figure	confirms	that	the	difference	in	programme	participation	
between	the	age	groups	indeed	occurs	after	90	days	of	unemployment,	which	ensures	that	we	
can	obtain	estimates	for	the	threat	effect	(i.e.	any	possible	effects	observed	before	90	days	are	
not	due	to	programme	participation).	
                                                 
19 Individuals are likely to be informed about the programme upon registration at the PES and/or during their first meeting with a 
caseworker, which should take place within 30 days of unemployment. However, individuals can also learn about the programme 
from information sheets available at the PES as well as from the PES website.  
20	Note	that	this	type	of	response	is	unlikely	among	UI	recipients	as	registration	at	the	PES	is	required	in	order	to	receive	UI	
benefits.		
21	McCrary	(2008)	develops	a	formal	test	of	the	null	hypothesis	of	continuity	of	the	density	of	the	assignment	variable	at	the	
cut‐off,	against	the	alternative	hypothesis	that	there	is	jump	in	the	density	function	at	that	point.	We	cannot	reject	the	null;	
the	test	statistic	has	value	0.0097	and	standard	error	0.0158.	
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5.2 Results	for	the	whole	sample	
We	first	present	a	graphical	analysis	of	our	data,	with	the	purpose	of	analysing	whether	there	
are	any	 jumps	in	the	job	finding	probability	at	the	YJG	eligibility	threshold	(i.e.	between	24‐	
and	25‐year‐olds).	We	use	four	dummy	variables	to	measure	the	effect	on	employment:	These	
indicate	whether	the	individual	became	employed	during	the	first	90,	180,	270	and	365	days	
after	entering	unemployment.	Hence,	the	first	outcome	(D90)	measures	the	threat	effect,	while	
the	other	outcomes	(D180,	D270	and	D365)	capture	the	total	effect	of	programme	eligibility	after	
different	 length	 of	 time.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 latter	 three	 outcomes	 capture	 a	
combination	 of	 the	 threat	 effect	 and	 possible	 programme	 effects.	 The	 causal	 effect	 of	 the	
programme	 itself	 (say	 the	 probability	 of	 finding	 work	 between	 days	 90	 –	 180	 of	 the	
unemployment	 spell,	 while	 the	 individual	 already	 participates	 in	 activation)	 cannot	 be	
estimated	without	stronger	assumptions,	as	 the	 individuals	who	remain	unemployed	at	day	
90	are	no	longer	representative	of	the	overall	pool	of	unemployed.		
The	 threat	 effect	 (or	 pre‐programme	 effect)	 is	 analysed	 in	 Figure	 4a.	 In	 the	 figure,	 the	
individuals	 in	 the	 data	 are	 arranged	 according	 to	 their	 age	 at	 day	 90	 after	 entering	
unemployment,	 and	 age	 is	 measured	 relative	 to	 the	 cut‐off	 age	 25.	 That	 is,	 the	 negative	
portion	of	 the	x‐axis	 in	Figure	4a	consists	of	 individuals	who	would	become	eligible	 for	 the	
YJG	if	remaining	unemployed	for	90	days.	Individuals	are	divided	into	bins	of	one	month,	and	
we	plot	bin	averages	of	the	D90‐dummy.	As	our	age	variable	is	continuous	‐	it	is	measured	in	
days	‐	a	full‐fledged	RD	analysis	 is	possible.	We	fit	 local	 linear	regressions	of	D90	on	relative	
age	 using	 a	 triangle	 kernel	 and	 an	 optimal	 bandwidth	 (as	 defined	 by	 Imbens	 and	
Kalyanaraman	2012).22	Bins	with	ݔ ൏ െ3	and	ݔ ൐ 3	are	excluded	from	the	figure	for	clarity,	as	
we	 want	 to	 focus	 on	 individuals	 close	 to	 the	 eligibility	 cut‐off.	 The	 solid	 line	 in	 the	 figure	
shows	the	fitted	values	from	these	regressions,	and	the	dashed	lines	show	the	associated	95	
percent	confidence	intervals.		
Figure	 4a	 indicates	 that	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 threat	 effect,	 even	 though	 it	 appears	 to	 be	
small:	 being	 eligible	 for	 the	YJG	programme	 (i.e.	 being	under	25	 years	 of	 age	 at	 90	days	of	
unemployment)	increases	the	probability	of	finding	employment	during	the	first	90	days	after	
entering	unemployment	spell	by	around	2	percentage	points.	Taking	into	account	that	about	
28	percent	of	the	25‐year‐olds	find	employment	within	90	days,	this	would	correspond	to	an	
increase	of	about	7	percent.	
                                                 
22	There	are	several	different	ways	of	calculating	the	optimal	bandwidth	in	an	RD	design,	with	no	clear	consensus	on	which	is	
the	best	one.	We	analyse	the	robustness	of	our	results	to	a	wide	variety	of	bandwidths	in	Section	5.3.		
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Figures	4b‐d	present	similar	analyses	of	the	effect	at	day	180,	270	and	365	after	the	onset	
of	 unemployment.	That	 is,	we	 look	 at	 the	 relationship	 between	age	 and	 the	D180‐,	D270‐	 and	
D365‐dummies.	The	figures	show	statistically	significant	effects	of	programme	eligibility	also	at	
day	180	and	270,	but	not	at	day	365.	Hence,	the	figures	suggest	that	job	finding	among	those	
ineligible	for	the	YJG	programme	starts	to	catch	up	later	on	during	the	unemployment	period.		
We	next	report	RD‐estimates	of	the	effect	of	being	eligible	for	the	YJG	programme	for	the	
different	outcome	variables.	These	results	are	shown	in	Table	3,	and	they	confirm	the	results	
from	 the	 graphical	 analysis:	 The	 threat	 effect	 for	 the	 whole	 sample	 is	 approximately	 2	
percentage	points,	which	corresponds	to	an	increase	of	around	7	percent	if	we	relate	it	to	the	
average	outcome	among	25‐year‐olds.	(The	estimated	effects	reported	in	Table	3	are	positive,	
as	 the	observed	drop	 in	 the	 employment	probability	 at	 the	 threshold	of	 turning	25	 (Fig.	 2)	
corresponds	to	a	positive	effect.	That	is,	younger	individuals	–	those	who	are	eligible	for	the	
programme	–	have	a	higher	probability	of	finding	work.)		
The	 employment	 probability	 remains	 higher	 among	 those	 who	 are	 eligible	 for	 the	 YJG	
programme	 also	 at	 day	 180	 and	 day	 270	 after	 registration	 at	 the	 PES.	 A	 year	 after	 the	
beginning	of	unemployment,	the	effects	are	no	longer	statistically	significant.23	Given	that	the	
effect	 within	 180	 days	 (or	 later)	 is	 not	 notably	 higher	 than	 the	 threat	 effect,	 the	 results	
indicate	 that	 participation	 in	 the	 activation	 measures	 in	 itself	 does	 not	 significantly	 affect	
employment	 probabilities.	 The	 overall	 effects	 of	 the	 programme	 can	 therefore	 largely	 be	
attributed	to	the	threat	effect.		
	How	do	our	results	compare	with	earlier	estimates	of	the	magnitude	of	the	threat	effect?	
Due	to	differences	in	programme	details,	empirical	methods	and	the	way	results	are	reported,	
the	comparison	is	not	necessarily	straightforward.	For	example,	Black	et	al.	(2003)	find	that	
the	 programme	 they	 study	 shortened	 the	 unemployment	 spell	 by	 two	 weeks.	 The	
corresponding	estimate	 in	Rosholm	and	Svarer	 is	 two	and	a	half	weeks.	Papers	 that	 report	
time‐specific	hazards	 find	 large	 short‐time	 increases	 in	employment	hazards	 (e.g.	Hägglund	
2011,	Geerdsen	2006).	The	most	closely	linked	papers	to	ours	are	perhaps	those	studying	an	
earlier	Swedish	programme	targeted	at	youth.	Carling	and	Larsson	(2005)	find	that	the	threat	
effect	 amounts	 to	 a	 10	 per	 cent	 increase	 in	 the	 job	 finding	 rate,	 but	 the	 impact	 quickly	
vanishes	and	reaches	zero	by	120	days.	Forslund	and	Nordström	Skans	(2006)	find	that	the	
probability	 of	 still	 being	 registered	 with	 the	 public	 employment	 service	 declined	 by	 4%	
during	 the	 first	 90	 days	 of	 unemployment.	 Our	 result	 –	 an	 approximately	 seven	 per	 cent	
                                                 
23	 Since	 the	data	 ends	 in	February	2010,	we	 sometimes	need	 to	 restrict	 the	 sample	 in	order	 to	 follow	 the	unemployment	
spells	 long	enough	(e.g.	when	studying	the	probability	of	 finding	employment	within	a	year,	 the	sample	is	 limited	to	spells	
beginning	at	least	a	year	before).		
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increase	 in	 the	 job	 finding	rate	due	 to	being	eligible	 for	 the	 treatment	–	 is	well	 in	 line	with	
these	earlier	studies.		
When	discussing	the	magnitude	of	the	effects,	however,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	effects	
that	we	have	reported	are	intention	to	treat	effects,	i.e.	effects	of	programme	eligibility.	When	
interpreting	 the	 results,	one	must	bear	 in	mind	 that	programme	take‐up	 is	 incomplete.	The	
relationship	 between	 age	 (at	 90	 days	 of	 unemployment)	 and	 participation	 in	 the	 YJG	
programme	is	depicted	in	Figure	5.	The	figure	is	drawn	in	a	similar	way	as	Figures	4a‐d,	but	
the	dependent	variable	 is	now	a	dummy	for	actual	participation	in	the	YJG	programme.	The	
bandwidth	chosen	is	the	same	as	in	the	estimation	for	the	D180	dependent	variable.	The	figure	
is	 drawn	 only	 for	 the	 relevant	 subpopulation,	 i.e.	 individuals	 whose	 unemployment	 spell	
lasted	over	90	days.	
Figure	5	reveals	an	interesting	pattern.	Take‐up	is	practically	zero	for	individuals	over	25	
years	of	age,	as	it	should	be.	For	most	age	groups	below	25,	take‐up	is	around	50	percent,	but	
it	 falls	 sharply	 before	 the	 25‐year	 threshold.	 The	 likely	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 caseworkers	
have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 assign	 individuals	 to	 the	 programme	 straight	 away	 at	 90	 days	 of	
unemployment;	 rather,	 assignment	 takes	 some	 time	 (e.g.	 due	 to	 the	 high	 workload	 on	
caseworkers),	 and	 the	 individual’s	 age	 is	 checked	 only	 at	 the	 time	 when	 programme	
assignment	is	considered.	Some	people	who	are	close	to	25	at	day	90	have	therefore	turned	
25	by	that	time,	and	are	no	longer	eligible.	There	is	nevertheless	a	statistically	significant	drop	
in	take‐up	at	the	threshold	of	around	25	percentage	points.		
The	effects	that	we	have	reported	above	in	Table	3,	correspond	to	a	sharp	RD	design,	and	
should	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 intention	 to	 treat	 effects	 –	 they	 are	 the	 effects	 of	 programme	
eligibility.	On	 the	other	hand,	Figure	5	 clearly	 shows	 that	programme	assignment	was	very	
fuzzy.	Using	a	fuzzy	RD	design,	we	get	an	estimate	of,	e.g.,	the	threat	effect	of	0.153	(standard	
error	0.0463),	i.e.	an	approximately	15	percentage	point	increase	in	the	probability	of	finding	
work	 during	 the	 first	 90	 days	 after	 entering	 unemployment.	 Naturally,	 this	 effect	 is	
considerably	higher	than	the	sharp	RD‐estimate,	since	it	is	essentially	a	Wald/IV‐estimate	that	
involves	dividing	the	sharp	RD‐estimate	with	the	estimated	jump	in	take‐up	at	the	threshold.		
When	 take‐up	 is	 incomplete,	 one	 would	 usually	 consider	 the	 fuzzy	 estimates	 to	 be	
preferable,	 as	 they	 take	 into	 account	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 everyone	 who	 is	 eligible	 actually	
receives	 the	 treatment.	 In	our	 context,	 the	 fuzzy	estimates	are	 somewhat	hard	 to	 interpret:	
how	should	one	think	of	the	threat	effect	on	the	“compliers”,	as	the	threat	effect	is	about	what	
happens	before	people	actually	enter	the	programme.	On	the	other	hand,	if	one	considers	the	
low	actual	take‐up	to	affect	the	strength	of	the	threat	(if	people	know	that	the	programme	is	
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not	 strictly	 enforced),	 the	 fuzzy	estimate	 can	be	 thought	of	 as	 a	meaningful	measure	of	 the	
threat	effect,	as	it	takes	the	strength	of	the	threat	into	account.	Nevertheless,	since	the	sharp	
RD	 estimates	 are	 more	 straightforward	 to	 interpret	 in	 our	 context,	 we	 focus	 on	 them	 in	
following	analyses.	
5.3 Results	by	subgroups	
We	 next	 turn	 to	 analyse	 how	 the	 effects	 of	 programme	 eligibility	 differ	 by	 individual	
background.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 our	 motivating	 idea	 –	 whether	 the	 programme	
functions	 as	 a	 screening	 device	 and/or	 whether	 it	 helps	 disadvantaged	 individuals	 with	 a	
difficult	 labour	 market	 position	 –	 we	 need	 a	 measure	 of	 an	 individual’s	 labour	 market	
prospects	 overall	 (not	 yet	 thinking	 about	 any	 programme	 effects).	 To	 achieve	 this,	we	 first	
take	a	look	at	how	the	individual	background	characteristics	found	in	our	data	are	related	to	
the	probability	of	finding	employment	during	the	first	year	of	the	unemployment	spell	before	
the	reform.	The	results	are	presented	in	Table	4.		
A	number	of	groups	stand	out:	Individuals	with	compulsory	education	only	and	those	born	
outside	the	Nordic	countries	appear	to	have	a	clearly	lower	probability	of	finding	a	job	than	
others.	Regarding	the	health	variables,	individuals	who	received	disability	pension,	who	were	
treated	for	mental	illness	(including	both	inpatient	and	outpatient	care)	or	took	a	neurological	
drug	appear	to	have	particularly	low	job	finding	rates.		
To	create	a	summary	measure	of	the	individual’s	labour	market	position,	we	use	the	model	
reported	in	Table	4	to	predict	employment	probabilities	for	the	individuals	in	our	sample.	We	
then	divide	the	sample	into	quartiles	by	the	predicted	probabilities:	those	in	the	1st	quartile	
have	the	worst	employment	prospects,	whereas	those	in	the	4th	quartile	are	most	likely	to	find	
work	 (based	 on	 observable	 characteristics).	 Given	 that	 many	 characteristics	 (beyond,	 say,	
education)	are	related	to	labour	market	prospects,	this	procedure	has	clear	advantages	over	
concentrating	 on	 any	 single	 variable	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 disadvantageousness.	 The	 approach	 is	
particularly	attractive	as	it	allows	us	to	take	full	advantage	of	the	richness	of	our	data.	24		
Using	a	prediction	model	to	classify	individuals	according	to	their	labour	market	prospects	
is	not	uncommon	in	the	programme	evaluation	literature;	recent	examples	include	Altmann	et	
al.	 (2016)	 and	 Nekoei	 and	 Weber	 (2017).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 we	 estimate	 the	
                                                 
24	This	procedure	has	similarities	 to	 that	 in	Black	et	al.	 (2003),	who	use	subgroups	by	profiling	scores	to	test	whether	the	
profiling	 score	 system	used	 to	 allocate	 assistance	programmes	 to	 the	unemployed	works	 as	 intended.	 The	profiling	 score	
estimation	appears	to	have	used	a	very	limited	set	of	individual	background	characteristics	(Berger	et	al.	1997).	
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prediction	model	on	out‐of‐sample	data	 (i.e.	pre‐reform	data	 from	2007),	 and	we	 therefore	
avoid	any	biases	that	might	arise	from	endogenous	stratification	(Abadie	et	al.	2016).25		
Descriptive	statistics	 for	the	different	quartiles	are	reported	in	Table	B1	in	the	Appendix.	
There	 is	 a	 clear	 concentration	 of	mental	 health	 problems	 in	 the	 1st	 quartile:	 e.g.,	 ten	 times	
more	 of	 the	 individuals	 in	 the	 1st	 quartile	were	 treated	 for	mental	 illness	 in	 the	 past	 year,	
compared	to	individuals	in	the	4th	quartile.	It	is	also	much	more	common	for	individuals	in	the	
1st	quartile	to	have	received	disability	pension.	On	the	other	hand,	the	quartiles	do	not	differ	
notably	 in	the	other	health	 indicators.	Even	though	 low	education	and	 immigrant	status	are	
very	important	for	labour	market	prospects,	our	data	clearly	indicates	that	past	mental	health	
problems	are	also	crucial	in	this	respect.	
We	 next	 estimate	 the	 effect	 of	 programme	 eligibility	 by	 quartiles	 of	 the	 predicted	
employment	probabilities.	The	results	are	shown	in	Figures	6	and	7	(for	the	threat	effect	and	
the	effect	until	day	180,	respectively)	and	in	Table	5.		
We	find	no	evidence	that	individuals	in	the	most	disadvantaged	labour	market	position	are	
affected	by	the	threat	of	activation:	The	estimated	threat	effect	is	close	to	zero	and	statistically	
insignificant	for	the	lowest	quartile,	while	it	is	significant	at	the	5	percent	level	for	the	second	
and	 third	 quartiles	 and	 strongly	 significant	 for	 the	 top	 quartile.	 These	 results	 are	 thus	
consistent	with	the	idea	that	individuals	in	a	better	labour	market	position	may	be	more	likely	
to	respond	to	the	threat	of	activation,	and	hence	with	the	notion	that	activation	programmes	
may	work	 as	 a	 screening	 device.	 If	 we	 relate	 the	 estimated	 effects	 for	 quartiles	 2‐4	 to	 the	
mean	 outcome	 among	 25‐year‐olds,	 they	 correspond	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 probability	 of	
finding	employment	during	the	first	90	days	of	by	approximately	7	percent.26			
The	effect	of	programme	eligibility	remains	statistically	significant	at	the	5	percent	level	for	
quartile	4	also	at	180	days	after	entering	unemployment,	though	the	effect	in	relative	terms	is	
somewhat	 smaller	 in	 size	 compared	 to	 the	 estimated	 threat	 effect	 (around	 7	 percent	
compared	to	5	percent).	The	results	also	indicate	that	the	effects	for	quartiles	2‐4	are	driven	
by	 the	 threat	 of	 programme	 participation,	 as	 entering	 the	 activation	 phase	 itself	 does	 not	
appear	 to	 strengthen	 the	 estimated	 effects	 for	 these	 groups.	 The	 effect	 within	 180	 days	 is	
                                                 
25	The	problem	noted	by	Abadie	et	al.	(2016)	would	arise	if	the	prediction	model	were	estimated	on	control	group	data	and	
then	used	 to	 form	predictions	 for	both	 treatment	and	control	group.	This	would	 lead	 to	over‐fitting	of	observations	 in	 the	
control	group..	In	our	case,	both	the	control	group	and	treatment	group	data	come	from	2008‐2009,	whereas	the	prediction	
model	is	estimated	on	data	on	unemployment	spells	in	2007.	Nekoei	and	Weber	(2017)	use	a	similar	procedure	to	avoid	the	
problem	of	over‐fitting.  
26	Also	in	quartile	1,	the	relative	“effect”	is	about	7%,	but	we	would	not	conclude	that	there	is	an	effect	in	the	1st	quartile.	As	
noted	 above,	 the	 estimated	 effect	 itself	 is	 very	 small	 and	 far	 from	being	 statistically	 significant,	 and	 the	magnitude	of	 the	
relative	effect	is	driven	by	dividing	this	estimate	by	a	small	number	i.e.	the	baseline	job‐finding	rate	in	the	1st	quartile.	Note	
also	 that	 if	 anything,	 one	would	 expect	 the	 relative	 effect	 to	 be	 largest	 for	 the	 first	 quartile,	 if	 the	 individuals	 in	 the	 first	
quartile	were	to	react	at	all:	as	the	baseline	job‐finding	rate	is	very	low	(10%	in	the	first	90	days	of	the	unemployment	spell),	
there	should	be	much	room	for	effects	from	policy	interventions.		
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marginally	 significant	 also	 for	 the	 lowest	 quartile.	While	 this	 provides	 suggestive	 evidence	
that	some	individuals	in	the	lowest	quartile	respond	to	activation	measures,	the	results	do	not	
provide	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 benefits	 from	 activation	 would	 be	 concentrated	
among	those	most	in	need	of	assistance.		
At	 later	 follow‐up	 times,	 i.e.	 at	 day	 270	 and	 365	 after	 the	 onset	 of	 unemployment	 (not	
shown),	 there	are	no	 longer	any	statistically	significant	differences	between	the	eligible	and	
ineligible	in	terms	of	transitions	to	employment.	Hence,	while	programme	eligibility	seems	to	
have	shortened	unemployment	spells	for	some	of	the	unemployed	individuals	–	in	particular	
those	 with	 a	 more	 advantaged	 labour	 market	 position	 –	 we	 find	 no	 long	 term	 effects	 on	
employment	for	any	of	the	groups.	
Finally,	as	explained	at	the	end	of	Section	5.2,	we	focus	on	intention	to	treat	effects	from	a	
sharp	RD	design	(rather	than	Wald	estimates	from	a	fuzzy	RD	design),	because	the	distinction	
between	 compliers	 vs.	 non‐compliers	 is	 somewhat	 hard	 to	 interpret	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
threat	effect.	It	is	nevertheless	important	to	check	that	there	is	a	significant	jump	in	take‐up	at	
the	age	eligibility	threshold	in	each	quartile.	Figure	B.4	in	the	appendix	confirms	that	this	 is	
the	case.	The	 jump	 is	somewhat	 larger	 for	 the	 top	quartiles,	but	still	 close	 to	20	percentage	
points	for	the	lowest	quartile.	The	simple	fact	that	these	individuals	have	registered	at	the	PES	
implies	that	they	should	be	willing	and	able	to	work,	despite	some	individuals	being	in	a	more	
challenging	 position	 than	 others.	 The	 official	 rules	 for	 programme	participation	 are	 similar	
regardless	 of	 individual	 background	 characteristics,	 and	 possible	 differences	 in	 subsequent	
programme	 assignment	 or	 take‐up	 probabilities	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 hard	 for	 the	 individuals	 to	
predict	a	priori.		
5.4 Validity	and	robustness	checks	
We	now	turn	to	assess	the	validity	of	our	RD	design.	Since	some	of	our	main	conclusions	stem	
from	 the	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 treatment	 effect	 varies	 by	 quartiles	 of	 predicted	 employment	
probabilities,	we	perform	robustness	checks	both	based	on	the	entire	sample	and	separately	
by	quartiles.	We	discuss	all	robustness	checks	below,	but	for	the	sake	of	space,	we	report	the	
detailed	results	by	subgroup	in	a	separate	online	appendix;	see	Appendix	C.	
5.4.1 Balance	of	background	variables	and	robustness	to	covariates	
First,	we	check	whether	there	are	any	discontinuities	in	any	pre‐determined	variables	at	the	
eligibility	cut‐off.	When	examining	the	balance	of	background	variables	at	 the	threshold,	we	
look	at	the	following	variables:	gender,	birthplace	(dummy	for	being	born	outside	the	Nordic	
countries),	 being	disabled,	 three	education	dummies,	 employment	 status	 the	previous	 year,	
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income	 from	 work	 the	 previous	 year,	 unemployment	 insurance	 receipt	 the	 previous	 year,	
social	assistance	receipt	the	previous	year,	being	a	parent	in	2007,	and	the	month	of	entry	into	
unemployment.		
We	draw	figures	similar	to	Figure	4	for	all	the	background	variables,	and	run	separate	RD	
analyses	 –	 identical	 to	 those	 that	 we	 conducted	 for	 the	 outcomes	 of	 interest	 –	 for	 each	
background	variable	 to	estimate	 the	magnitude	of	any	possible	 jumps	at	 the	 threshold.	The	
results	are	depicted	in	Figure	8.	To	keep	the	dimensions	of	the	figure	manageable,	we	exclude	
dummies	for	the	month	of	entry	into	unemployment,	even	though	we	have	run	balance	checks	
also	for	those	since	the	time	of	entry	may	influence	employment	prospects.	In	total,	we	have	
run	 balance	 checks	 for	 36	 background	 variables.	 Most	 of	 the	 background	 variables	 are	
balanced	at	the	threshold.	However,	two	variables	have	jumps	that	are	statistically	significant	
at	 the	 5	%	 level	 (entering	unemployment	 in	October,	where	 the	 estimated	 jump	 is	 ‐0.0095	
(s.e.	 0.0039),	 and	 having	 used	more	 than	 two	medicines	 in	 the	 previous	 year	 (0.0123,	 s.e.	
0.0052)),	and	two	variables	at	10	%	level	(unemployment	 insurance	receipt	 in	the	previous	
year	 (‐0.0109,	 s.e.	 0.0057)	 and	 social	 assistance	 receipt	 in	 the	 previous	 year	 (0.0098,	 s.e.	
0.0051)).		
Given	that	we	have	a	 large	number	of	background	variables,	some	statistically	significant	
jumps	are	of	course	expected.	The	discontinuities	that	we	observe	do	not	seem	to	follow	any	
particular	pattern	(e.g.	indicating	that	individuals	with	background	characteristics	associated	
with	 good	 employment	 prospects	 would	 be	 concentrated	 on	 the	 left‐hand‐side	 of	 the	
threshold).	 To	 further	 ensure	 that	 our	 results	 are	 not	 driven	 by	 any	 kind	 of	 selection	 of	
individuals	at	the	threshold,	we	check	the	robustness	of	our	results	to	including	controls	for	
background	 characteristics.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 variables	 included	 in	 Figure	 8	 and	 month	
dummies,	the	regressions	also	control	for	municipality	fixed	effects.	Our	results	are	robust	to	
controlling	for	background	characteristics:	The	estimates	for	the	threat	effect	and	the	effect	at	
day	180	remain	highly	significant	and	the	point	estimates	stay	very	similar;	see	Table	6.		
We	 have	 also	 checked	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 background	 variables	 and	 the	 robustness	 to	
adding	covariates	 for	 the	estimations	by	quartiles;	 see	Figures	C.2─C.5	and	Table	C.1	 in	 the	
online	appendix. 27	As	 in	 the	main	analysis,	 there	are	some	statistically	significant	 jumps	for	
some	of	 the	background	variables.	Again,	 the	discontinuities	seem	quite	random	and	do	not	
                                                 
27	The	dummy	for	disability	pension	is	not	 included	in	the	figures	for	quartiles	3	and	4,	as	there	are	too	few	individuals	 in	
these	quartiles	with	disability	pension	 to	run	an	RD	analysis.	The	dummy	 is	however	 included	as	a	control	 in	 the	analysis	
with	covariates	for	all	quartiles.	
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appear	to	have	any	meaningful	pattern.28	 It	 is	also	reassuring	that	the	treatment	impact	and	
the	 pattern	 of	 reactions	 across	 the	 quartiles	 remain	 qualitatively	 the	 same	 when	 adding	
covariates.		
5.4.2 Placebo	tests	
As	a	further	robustness	check,	we	carry	out	several	placebo	tests.	First,	our	data	allow	us	to	
examine	 the	 presence	 of	 pseudo‐effects	 before	 the	 YJG	 programme	 was	 actually	 in	 place.	
However,	 individuals	who	became	unemployed	before	 the	 end	of	2006	may	 still	 have	been	
affected	by	 the	previous	youth	programme29,	 and	 towards	 the	end	of	2007	 individuals	may	
start	 to	 anticipate	 that	 if	 they	 stay	 unemployed	 long	 enough,	 they	 will	 eventually	 become	
eligible	for	the	YJG	programme	(from	December	2007	onwards).	For	this	reason,	we	limit	this	
placebo	 check	 to	 examining	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 threat	 effect	 among	 those	 who	 became	
unemployed	 during	 January‐June	 2007.	 (Ending	 the	 sampling	 in	 June	 is	 a	 cautious	 yet	
somewhat	ad	hoc	choice,	since	it	is	not	clear	when	the	first	anticipation	effects	might	occur,	if	
there	are	any.	The	programme	was	first	suggested	already	in	April	2007	and	the	government	
bill	 was	 given	 in	 May,	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 unemployed	 youth	 might	 not	 be	 very	 well	
informed	about	such	policy	plans.	The	results	are	not	affected	if	we	consider	unemployment	
spells	 that	 started	 e.g.	 in	 January‐August	 2007	 instead.)	 Figure	 9	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 no	
discontinuity	at	the	threshold	for	this	sample.	
We	have	also	 examined	whether	 there	are	 	placebo	effects	 at	 the	 threshold	between	23‐	
and	24‐year‐olds	(where	age	is	again	measured	at	day	90	of	the	unemployment	spell,	with	this	
placebo	 threshold	 corresponding	 to	 ‐1	 on	 the	 x‐axis	 in	 Figure	 4),	 as	 well	 as	 the	 threshold	
between	 25‐	 and	 26‐year‐olds	 (+1	 on	 the	 x‐axis	 in	 Figure	 4).	 There	 are	 no	 labour	market	
programmes	or	other	relevant	policies	that	would	be	expected	to	cause	a	discontinuity	in	the	
probability	of	finding	work	at	these	thresholds.	Indeed,	all	estimated	effects	are	close	to	zero	
at	both	thresholds;	see	Table	7.		
The	same	placebo	tests	have	been	performed	for	the	estimations	by	quartiles	(see	Figure	
C.14	and	Tables	C.2─C.3	in	the	online	appendix).	The	results	from	the	placebo	tests	in	2007	by	
quartiles	do	not	give	rise	to	any	concerns.	Most	of	the	placebos	by	quartiles	for	the	thresholds	
                                                 
28	 Quartile	 2	 might	 seem	 somewhat	 problematic:	 there	 are	 statistically	 significant	 and	 positive	 jumps	 in	 two	 sickness	
variables	(had	a	neurological	drug,	had	more	than	two	medicines)	as	well	as	in	the	disability	pension	dummy.	On	the	other	
hand,	 according	 to	 Table	 4,	 having	 had	 more	 than	 two	 medicines	 is	 actually	 associated	 with	 better	 rather	 than	 worse	
employment	 prospects.	 There	 is	 also	 a	negative	 jump	 in	 having	 received	 unemployment	 benefits	 the	 previous	 year.	 After	
adding	covariates,	the	threat	effect	for	quartile	2	is	significant	only	at	the	10	%	level.	The	results	for	the	other	quartiles,	as	
well	as	the	overall	pattern	of	reactions	(no	reaction	for	quartile	1,	strongly	significant	reactions	for	the	upper	quartiles)	are	
robust	however.	
29	Until	the	end	of	2006,	unemployed	20─24‐year‐olds	were	assigned	to	activities	organised	by	the	municipalities	within	the	
programme	Youth	Guarantee.	The	Youth	Guarantee	was	still	in	place	during	2007,	but	no	new	unemployed	individuals	should	
have	been	assigned	to	this	programme	after	the	end	of	2006. 
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of	turning	24	and	26	are	also	not	statistically	significant,	but	there	are	some	negative	impacts	
of	turning	24	(for	quartile	3)	and	turning	26	(for	quartile	2).	However,	as	the	corresponding	
estimated	treatment	impact	in	the	main	analysis	is	positive,	these	observations	work	against	
detecting	 a	 significant	 treatment	 impact.	 Further,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 separate	
placebo	 tests	 at	 each	 threshold	 are	 not	 independent:	 e.g.	 both	 results	 at	 the	 threshold	 of	
turning	26	for	quartile	2	are	driven	by	the	“effect”	for	D90	for	this	quartile	at	this	threshold.		
5.4.3 Robustness	to	bandwidth	selection	
Figures	10	and	11	plot	the	estimated	effects	(and	the	95	percent	confidence	intervals)	 from	
the	 sharp	RD	 design	 (the	 effects	 of	 programme	 eligibility)	 as	 a	 function	 of	 bandwidth.	 The	
figures	 show	 that	 our	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 bandwidth	 selection.	 The	 threat	 effect	 and	 the	
effect	 during	 days	 1‐180	 become	 insignificant	 only	 at	 bandwidths	 far	 below	 the	 optimal	
bandwidth.30	 In	 online	 Appendix	 C	 we	 show	 figures	 similar	 to	 Figures	 10	 and	 11	 for	 the	
different	 quartiles	 of	 predicted	 employment	 probabilities;	 see	 Figures	 C.6─C.13.	 The	
estimates	 in	 particular	 for	 the	 second	 quartile	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 at	 bit	 sensitive	 to	 bandwidth	
selection,	while	the	estimates	for	quartile	3	and	4	are	fairly	stable.	All	in	all,	the	result	that	the	
very	 weakest	 individuals	 ‐	 those	 in	 the	 lowest	 quartile	 ‐	 do	 not	 respond	 to	 the	 threat	 of	
activation	is	very	robust,	while	some	individuals	with	better	labour	market	prospects	do.  
5.4.4 	Calonico	et	al.	(2014)	robust	inference	
Calonico	et	 al.	 (2014)	 recognise	 that	 since	 implementing	an	RD	design	 in	practice	normally	
requires	using	observations	that	are	away	from	the	cut‐off	value	of	the	assignment	variable,	
ignoring	the	resulting	bias	 leads	to	biased	confidence	intervals	for	the	estimated	effects.	We	
have	 examined	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 results	 to	 using	 the	 robust	 inference	 procedure	
suggested	by	Calonico	et	al.	(2014).	The	results	are	reported	in	Table	8.		
The	robust	confidence	intervals	are	naturally	wider	than	their	conventional	counterparts.	
The	 threat	 effect	 (days	 1‐90)	 is	 now	 only	 significant	 at	 the	 10	 percent	 level	 for	 the	whole	
sample	 (robust	p‐value	0.082),	and	 the	same	applies	 to	 the	effect	 for	days	1‐270	(robust	p‐
values	0.094).	The	effect	for	days	1‐180,	on	the	other	hand,	remains	statistically	significant	at	
the	5	percent	 level.	A	 similar	analysis	 for	 the	 subgroups	 is	presented	 in	online	Appendix	C,	
                                                 
30	 The	 finding	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 programme	 eligibility	 go	 toward	 zero	 for	 the	 smallest	 bandwidths	 (i.e.	 very	 close	 to	 the	
threshold)	has	a	natural	explanation	in	our	case:	this	is	explained	by	the	behavior	of	take‐up	close	to	the	threshold.	Given	that	
there	is	only	a	fairly	small	jump	in	take‐up	at	the	threshold,	it	would	be	surprising	if	we	were	to	find	large	effects	there.	This	
conjecture	is	supported	by	the	following	finding:	If	we	take	into	account	incomplete	take‐up	and	examine	the	robustness	of	
the	Wald	estimates	from	the	fuzzy	RD	design	(reported	at	the	end	of	Section	5.1),	the	point	estimates	do	not	decline	at	small	
bandwidths,	with	the	exception	of	the	estimate	for	D180	at	the	smallest	bandwidth	of	10	percent	of	the	optimum,	when	the	
estimates	are	very	imprecise	(see	Table	A.2).				
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Table	C.4.	The	threat	effect	remains	significant	at	the	10	percent	 level	for	quartile	3	and	the	
effect	for	days	1‐180	for	quartiles	3	and	4.	
5.4.5 Robustness	to	changes	in	the	definition	of	employment	
So	 far	 we	 have	 not	 considered	 a	 person	 employed	 if	 she	 received	 any	 type	 of	 subsidised	
employment.	In	2008	the	rules	for	eligibility	to	one	type	of	subsidised	employment,	New	Start	
Jobs,	differed	for	individuals	who	had/had	not	turned	25	(thus,	the	same	age	cut‐off	as	for	the	
YJG	 programme):	 Employers	 could	 receive	 this	 subsidy	 if	 hiring	 a	 person	 who	 had	 been	
unemployed	for	at	 least	6	months	if	this	person	had	not	yet	turned	25.	Individuals	who	had	
turned	25	had	to	be	unemployed	for	at	least	12	months	before	employers	would	be	entitled	to	
the	subsidy.31	By	disregarding	all	hires	where	the	New	Start	Job	subsidy	was	paid	out	we	thus	
risk	underestimating	the	effects	of	the	YJG	programme.	However,	as	we	show	in	Table	9,	our	
estimates	are	very	similar	 if	we	instead	treat	New	Start	 Jobs	as	regular	employment	(this	 is	
also	 the	 case	 for	 the	 estimates	 by	 quartiles;	 see	 the	Table	 C.5	 in	 the	 online	 appendix).	 The	
most	 likely	 reason	why	 our	 results	 are	 not	 affected	 is	 that	 few	 employers	 applied	 for	 this	
subsidy	at	the	time,	potentially	due	to	lack	of	information;	see	Liljeberg,	Sjögren	and	Vikström	
(2012).		
5.4.6 Accounting	for	changes	in	financial	incentives	
For	 an	 overwhelming	majority	 of	 the	 treated	 individuals	 (87	%),	 the	 programme	 involved	
participation	in	activation	policies	only.	However,	as	we	noted	in	Section	3,	a	proportion	of	the	
treated	individuals	were	not	only	subject	to	activation	policies,	but	also	experienced	changes	
in	 their	 financial	 incentives.	 Those	 unemployed	 who	 had	 children,	 who	 received	 the	 basic	
level	of	benefits	only,	or	whose	earnings‐related	benefit	exceeded	a	cap	level	were	excluded	
from	being	subject	 to	changes	 in	 financial	 incentives.	Given	 that	 the	groups	whose	 financial	
incentives	 changed	were	well	 defined,	we	 can	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	 programme	 eligibility	
separately	for	groups	whose	financial	incentives	changed	vs.	those	whose	did	not.	
We	would	expect	the	programme	to	have	stronger	effects	on	individuals	who	experienced	a	
cut	in	benefits	in	addition	to	activation.	This	is	indeed	what	we	find	–	see	Table	10.	However,	
the	average	effects	(both	before	entering	the	programme	and	afterwards)	are	indeed	positive	
also	for	those	who	did	not	face	a	cut	in	benefits:	hence	activation	has	an	effect	on	job	finding	
rates	even	in	the	absence	of	any	explicit	financial	incentives.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	 from	 these	 numbers	 we	 cannot	 derive	 causal	
estimates	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 incentives	 (compared	 to	 pure	 activation)	 on	 the	
                                                 
31	From	March	2009,	the	rules	are	the	same	for	24‐	and	25‐year‐olds:	the	six	months	rule	was	extended	also	to	also	cover	25‐
year‐olds. 
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probability	of	finding	work:	the	groups	whose	financial	incentives	changed	may	react	also	to	
activation	 in	 a	 different	way	 than	 others.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 check	 that	 the	 effects	
change	 in	 the	 expected	 direction,	 and	 statistically	 significant	 impacts	 also	 remain	 for	 the	
subgroup	without	changes	in	financial	incentives.		
We	 cannot	 carry	 out	 an	 analysis	 analogous	 to	 that	 in	 Table	 10	 for	 the	 quartiles,	 as	 the	
sample	 of	 individuals	who	 faced	 a	 benefit	 cut	 becomes	 too	 small	 for	 an	 RD	 analysis	when	
divided	 into	quartiles.	Despite	being	unable	 to	carry	out	a	comparison,	we	can	estimate	 the	
effects	 separately	 for	 the	 group	 whose	 financial	 incentives	 were	 not	 affected.	 The	 main	
pattern	 that	we	 find	 is	unaffected:	 the	 threat	effect	 is	 insignificant	 for	 the	 first	quartile	 and	
positive	for	the	upper	quartiles	–	see	Table	C.6	in	the	online	appendix32.	Alternatively,	we	can	
run	the	RD	analysis	while	controlling	for	a	dummy	indicating	whether	an	individual	belonged	
to	those	population	groups	who	were	subject	to	the	cut	 in	benefits	(if	they	were	eligible	 for	
the	programme).	This	 allows	 for	higher	 job	 finding	 rates	 for	 individuals	who	 faced	a	 cut	 in	
benefits,	as	well	as	different	effects	of	financial	incentives	in	each	quartile	(as	we	are	carrying	
out	the	analysis	separately	for	each	quartile).	All	our	results	remain	intact	if	we	control	for	the	
effect	of	financial	incentives	in	this	way,	as	shown	in	Table	C.7	in	the	online	appendix.	
6 Conclusion	
In	 this	paper,	we	 start	by	pointing	out	 that	within	 a	 search‐theoretic	 framework	where	 job	
seekers	 differ	 in	 their	 underlying	 job‐finding	probability,	 individual	 responses	 to	 activation	
policies	will	 follow	a	 certain	 type	of	pattern:	 Individuals	with	a	high	 job‐finding	probability	
respond	 already	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 activation,	 whereas	 individuals	 with	 a	 low	 job‐finding	
probability	 might	 catch	 up	 during	 the	 actual	 activation	 phase.	 The	 former	 effect	 points	
towards	 a	 screening	 role	 of	 activation	 policies,	 whereas	 the	 latter	 effect	 would	 imply	 that	
activation	truly	helps	those	in	need	of	assistance.		
We	 have	 used	 a	 regression	 discontinuity	 design	 to	 study	 the	 existence	 of	 this	 type	 of	 a	
pattern	 of	 responses	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 activation	 programme	 targeted	 at	 young	
unemployed	 individuals	 (the	 Youth	 Job	 Guarantee	 programme)	 introduced	 in	 Sweden	 in	
2007.	 The	 programme	 is	 a	 major	 country‐wide	 activation	 policy	 that	 affects	 all	 young	
unemployed	persons	below	the	age	of	25.	The	data	used	cover	the	whole	population	of	 job‐
seekers.	 The	 main	 novelty	 of	 the	 data	 set	 is	 that	 it	 contains	 very	 detailed	 information	 on	
individual	 characteristics,	 including	 register	 data	 on	 the	 health	 and	 labour‐market	
                                                 
32	The	effect	for	the	fourth	quartile	becomes	statistically	insignificant	however,	even	though	the	point	estimate	is	still	three	
times	larger	than	for	the	first	quartile,	as	in	our	earlier	analysis.	Again,	the	loss	in	significance	cannot	be	attributed	to	a	causal	
effect	of	financial	incentives,	but	may	be	due	to	a	different	(and	smaller)	sample.	
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background	 of	 the	 unemployed.	 We	 use	 this	 data	 to	 predict	 individual	 job‐finding	
probabilities	 (in	 the	 absence	 of	 activation),	 and	 conduct	 sub‐sample	 analysis	 using	 a	
procedure	that	avoids	the	problem	of	endogenous	stratification.		
Our	results	show	that	there	is	a	statistically	significant	and	robust	threat	effect	associated	
with	the	programme;	programme	eligibility	 increases	the	probability	of	 finding	work	before	
the	 programme	 starts	 by	 about	 7	 percent.	 The	 threat	 effect	 indeed	 follows	 a	 pattern	
consistent	with	 the	 screening	 hypothesis:	 The	 threat	 effect	 appears	 to	 be	mainly	 driven	 by	
individuals	 in	 a	 relatively	 good	 labour	 market	 position.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 we	 find	 no	
statistically	significant	threat	effect	among	individuals	with	characteristics	that	predict	poor	
prospects	of	 finding	a	 job	 (in	particular	 low	education,	 immigrant	background,	poor	mental	
health).	 We	 do	 not	 find	 any	 longer	 term	 effects	 of	 the	 programme:	 about	 a	 year	 after	
registration	at	the	employment	service,	job	finding	among	the	ineligible	seems	to	have	caught	
up	with	that	of	the	eligible.	
Mandatory	 activation	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 way	 to	 reduce	 the	 moral	 hazard	 related	 to	
unemployment	 insurance,	 and	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 paper	 indicates	 that	 it	may	 indeed	 serve	
this	 purpose	 by	 screening	 those	 who	 are	 less	 in	 need	 of	 support	 away	 from	 the	 pool	 of	
transfer	recipients.	Hence,	activation	may	be	a	way	to	preserve	efficiency	while	maintaining	
high	replacement	rates	for	the	unemployed.	However,	this	policy	conclusion	comes	with	two	
important	 caveats.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 the	 size	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 policy	 is	modest,	 perhaps	
because	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 actual	 activation	 (the	 take	 up)	 could	 be	 higher.	 Secondly,	 and	
perhaps	more	importantly,	the	type	of	policy	conducted	in	Sweden	was	clearly	not	sufficiently	
supportive	 for	 those	 with	 challenging	 labour	 market	 prospects.	 Instead	 of	 training	 geared	
towards	 enhancing	 job‐seeking	 skills,	 these	 youngsters	 are	 likely	 to	 need	 more	 thorough	
support,	such	as	counselling,	further	education	and	greater	emphasis	on	improved	health.		
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Figures	for	the	main	text	
	
	
Figure	1:	The	Youth	Job	Guarantee	Program	
	
	
	
	
Figure	2:	Number	of	individuals	entering	unemployment,	by	age	at	day	90	of	the	
unemployment	spell	
Note:	Age	in	years	relative	to	the	cut‐off	age	25	on	the	x‐axis.	
 
 
Open unemployment 
and registration at 
the PES  
(3 months) 
The Youth Job Guarantee: 
- In-depth assessment and counseling 
- Job seeking activities with coaching 
(at least 3 months, normally) 
The Youth Job Guarantee:  
- Work experience or training 
- Job seeking activities at least 4h/week 
(12 months, max 15 months in total) 
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Figure	5:	Youth	Job	Guarantee	take‐up	
Note:	Age	in	years	relative	to	the	cut‐off	age	25	on	the	x‐axis	and	an	indicator	for	participating	in	the	
programme	on	the	y‐axis.	Age	refers	to	the	individual’s	age	90	days	after	entering	unemployment.	The	
figure	is	drawn	only	for	individuals	whose	spell	lasted	over	90	days.	
 
	
Figure	6:	Effects	of	programme	eligibility	on	the	probability	of	becoming	employed	by	day	90,	
by	quartiles	
Note:	Age	in	years	relative	to	the	cut‐off	age	25	on	the	x‐axis	and	indicators	for	becoming	employed	during	the	first	
90	days	of	unemployment	on	the	y‐axes.	Age	refers	to	the	individual’s	age	90	days	after	entering	unemployment.	
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Figure	7:	Effects	of	programme	eligibility	on	the	probability	of	becoming	employed	by	day	
180,	by	quartiles	
Note:	Age	in	years	relative	to	the	cut‐off	age	25	on	the	x‐axis	and	indicators	for	becoming	employed	during	the	first	
180	days	of	unemployment	on	the	y‐axes.	Age	refers	to	the	individual’s	age	90	days	after	entering	unemployment.	
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Tables for the main text 
Table	1:	Descriptive	statistics	for	our	sample	
All All	in	the	YJG	program 24‐year‐olds 25‐year‐olds
Variables	 N	 Mean Sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd
		 		 	 	
No.	of	days	in	previous		
unemployment	spells 335,521	 378.3 441.9 45,765 312.1 310.6 37,796 370.2 369.9 34,777 415.1 420.0
No.	of	previous	spells 335,521	 2.921 2.785 45,765 2.341 1.905 37,796 2.940 2.451 34,777 3.240 2.744
No.	of	previous	
programs	 335,521	 0.839 1.688 45,765 1.245 1.615 37,796 0.945 1.642 34,777 0.964 1.747
Age	at	spellstart+90	
days	 335,521	 25.06 2.698 45,765 22.88 1.160 37,796 24.49 0.289 34,777 25.49 0.289
Country	of	birth,	Non‐
Nordic	 335,521	 0.238 0.426 45,765 0.169 0.375 37,796 0.241 0.428 34,777 0.258 0.438
Male	 335,521	 0.541 0.498 45,765 0.604 0.489 37,796 0.546 0.498 34,777 0.533 0.499
Unemployment	
benefits,	2007 322,488	 0.224 0.417 45,366 0.235 0.424 36,285 0.256 0.436 33,260 0.250 0.433
Married,	2007 322,488	 0.105 0.306 45,366 0.0437 0.204 36,285 0.0890 0.285 33,260 0.114 0.317
Social	assistance,	2007 322,488	 0.206 0.404 45,366 0.213 0.410 36,285 0.208 0.406 33,260 0.198 0.399
Employed,	Nov.	2007 322,488	 0.570 0.495 45,366 0.580 0.494 36,285 0.593 0.491 33,260 0.587 0.492
Income	from	work	
(SEK	100),	2007 322,488	 979.7 969.1 45,366 951.0 896.9 36,285 1,011 970.6 33,260 1,026 997.5
Children,	2007 335,521	 0.174 0.379 45,765 0.0830 0.276 37,796 0.146 0.353 34,777 0.183 0.386
Compulsory	education 313,718	 0.333 0.471 44,581 0.334 0.472 35,379 0.314 0.464 32,422 0.315 0.464
Upper	secondary	
education	(3	years) 313,718	 0.485 0.500 44,581 0.604 0.489 35,379 0.515 0.500 32,422 0.455 0.498
Post‐secondary	
education	 313,718	 0.182 0.386 44,581 0.0620 0.241 35,379 0.171 0.376 32,422 0.230 0.421
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Table	2:	Some	health	indicators,	previous	year	
	
Other	24‐	and	25‐year‐olds	
(not	unemployed)
All	in	the	YJG	program	
	
24‐year‐olds	
(in	our	sample)
25‐year‐olds	
(in	our	sample)
Variables	 N	 Mean Sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd
		 		
Number	of	prescriptions	 197,333	 1.830 2.961 45,765 1.725 2.615 37,796 1.922 2.991 34,777 1.996 3.065
Had	drug	for	neurological	
condition	 197,333	 0.119 0.323 45,765 0.129 0.335 37,796 0.153 0.360 34,777 0.164 0.370
Had	drug	for	mental	
illnessa	 197,333	 0.0692 0.254 45,765 0.0709 0.257 37,796 0.0945 0.293 34,777 0.102 0.302
Received	sickness	benefits	 197,333	 0.0557 0.229 45,765 0.0644 0.245 37,796 0.0789 0.270 34,777 0.0874 0.282
Received	disability	pension	 197,333	
	
0.00367
	
0.0605
	
45,765
	
0.00548
	
0.0739	
	
37,796
	
0.0122
	
0.110
	
34,777
	
0.0123
	
0.110
	
Was	treated	at	a	hospitalb	 197,333	 0.296 0.457 45,765 0.323 0.468 37,796 0.346 0.476 34,777 0.350 0.477
Was	a	psychiatric	patientb	 197,333	 0.0316 0.175 45,765 0.0357 0.185 37,796 0.0492 0.216 34,777 0.0516 0.221
	 	
Note:	aDrugs	for	mental	illness	is	a	subset	of	neurological	drugs.	bIncludes	both	inpatient	and	outpatient	care.	
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Table	3:	Estimated	effects	of	being	eligible	for	the	Youth	Job	Guarantee	Programme	(full	
sample)	
	 (1)	 (2) (3) (4)	
	 Threat	effect	 Effect	within	
180	days	
Effect	within	
270	days	
Effect	within	
365	days	
	 	 	
Effect	of	program	 0.0196***	 0.0238*** 0.0147** 0.0108	
eligibility	 (0.006)	 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)	
	 	 	
N	within	bandwidth	 117,202	 133,473 87,848 105,595	
Bandwidth	 1.605	 1.970 1.549 2.215	
Mean	of	outcome	
among	25‐year‐olds	 0.283	 0.399	 0.470	
	
0.508	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	
level.		
	
	
Table	4:	Relationship	between	background	characteristics	and	the	probability	of	finding	
employment	within	365	days	
	 Year	2007 	
	 	
Has	not	completed	upper	secondary	school ‐0.149*** 	
	 (0.00332) 	
Country	of	birth,	non‐Nordic	 ‐0.114*** 	
	 (0.00349) 	
Had	a	neurological	drug	 ‐0.0397*** 	
	 (0.00484) 	
Was	treated	at	a	hospital	 ‐0.00241 	
	 (0.00312) 	
Had	more	than	two	medicines	 0.0240*** 	
	 (0.00336) 	
Received	sickness	benefits ‐0.0110* 	
	 (0.00567) 	
Was	a	psychiatric	patient ‐0.0588*** 	
	 (0.00740) 	
Had	a	drug	for	mental	illness	 ‐0.0330*** 	
	 (0.00686) 	
Received	disability	pension	 ‐0.205*** 	
	 (0.0100) 	
Constant	 0.118 	
	 (0.113) 	
	 	
N	 147,617 	
R‐squared	 0.153 	
Mean	of	the	outcome	 0.600 	
Notes:	OLS‐estimates.	Heteroscedasticity	robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	
at	 the	10/5/1	percent	 level.	Other	control	variables:	age	and	age	squared	at	day	90,	gender,	post‐secondary	
education,	 information	 on	 education	 is	 missing,	 born	 in	 another	 Nordic	 country,	 disability,	 no.	 of	 days	 in	
previous	unemployment	spells,	no.	of	previous	unemployment	spells,	no.	of	previous	employment	programs,	a	
wide	 job	 search	 area,	 has	 children,	 lagged	 unemployment	 insurance	 take‐up,	 lagged	 marital	 status,	 lagged	
social	 assistance	 take‐up,	 lagged	 employment	 status,	 lagged	 income	 from	 work,	 and	 dummy	 variables	 for	
county	and	month	of	spell	start.						
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Table	5:	Effects	of	being	eligible	for	the	YJG	program,	by	quartiles	of	predicted	employment	
probabilities	
	 (1)	 (2) (3) (4)	
	 Quartile	1	 Quartile	2 Quartile	3 Quartile	4	
	 	
A.	Threat	effect	 0.00843	 0.0194** 0.0252** 0.0297***	
	 (0.007)	 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)	
	 	
N	within	bandwidth	 37,868	 37,868 41,629 45,574	
Bandwidth	 2.101	 2.089 2.278 2.368	
Mean	of	outcome	among	
25‐year‐olds	 0.116	 0.258	 0.348	 0.406	
	 	
B.	Effect	within	180	days	 0.0153*	 0.0220* 0.0227* 0.0280**	
	 (0.009)	 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)	
	 	
N	within	bandwidth	 34,552	 30,021 29,261 31,730	
Bandwidth	 2.080	 1.819 1.780 1.768	
Mean	of	outcome	among	
25‐year‐olds	 0.170	 0.363	 0.482	 0.568	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	Imbens‐	
Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	level.		
	
	
Table	6:	Robustness	to	adding	covariates	(full	sample)	
	 Threat	effect,	
with	covariates	
Days	1‐180,	
with	covariates	
	
Effect of program  0.0213***  0.0246*** 
Eligibility  (0.00553)  (0.00548) 
     
N  335521  312,082 
Bandwidth  1.605  1.970 
Mean	of	outcome	among	25‐year‐olds	 0.283 0.399
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	
level.	
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Table	7:	Placebo	tests,	comparing	other	age	groups	
	 (1)	 (2) (3) (4)	
	 Effect	within	
90	days	
Effect	within	
180	days	
Effect	within	
270	days	
Effect	within	
365	days	
	 	
A.	23‐	vs.	24‐year‐olds	 ‐0.00548	 ‐0.00530 ‐0.00183 ‐0.00512	
	 (0.006)	 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)	
	 	
N	 119,803	 120,462 93,004 80,276	
Bandwidth	 1.506	 1.640 1.494 1.549	
Mean	of	outcome	among	
24‐year‐olds	 0.304	 0.417	 0.479	 0.512	
	 	
B.	25‐	vs.	26‐year‐olds	 0.00118	 ‐2.90e‐05 ‐0.00110 ‐0.00152	
	 (0.006)	 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)	
	 	
N	 111,457	 106,081 99,679 104,813	
Bandwidth	 1.634	 1.687 1.890 2.366	
Mean	of	outcome	among	
26‐year‐olds	 0.283	 0.400	 0.469	 0.511	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	
level.	
	
	
Table	8:	Results	using	Calonico	et	al.	(2014)	robust	inference	procedure	(full	sample)	
	 (1) (2) (3) (4)	
	 Threat	
effect	
Effect	
within	180	
days	
Effect	
within	270	
days	
Effect	
within	365	
days	
	 	
Effect	of	programme	eligibility	 0.0196 0.0238 0.0147 0.0108	
	 	
Conventional	p‐value	 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.111	
Robust	p‐value		 0.082 0.010 0.094 0.184	
	 	
N	within	bandwidth	 117,202 133,473 87,848 105,595	
Bandwidth	 1.605 1.970 1.549 2.215	
Mean	of	outcome	among	25‐year‐
olds	 0.283	 0.399	 0.470	
	
0.508	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	
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Table	9:	Robustness	to	changes	in	the	definition	of	employment	(full	sample)	
	 (1) (2)
	 Baseline	estimates	
(Tab.	3,	col.	1)	
New	Start	Jobs	are	
treated	as	employment	
	
A.	Threat	effect		 0.0196*** 0.0200***	
	 (0.006) (0.006)	
	
N	within	bandwidth	 117,202 122,106	
Bandwidth	 1.605 1.670	
Mean	of	outcome	among	25‐	year‐olds	 0.283 0.282	
	
B.	Effect	within	180	days	 0.0238*** 0.0243***	
	 (0.006) (0.006)	
	
N	within	bandwidth	 133,473 137,644	
Bandwidth	 1.970 2.031	
Mean	of	outcome	among	25‐year‐olds	 0.399 0.400	
	
C.	Effect	within	270	days	 	 	0.0147** 0.0154**	
	 (0.007) (0.007)	
	
N	within	bandwidth	 87,848 86,147	
Bandwidth	 1.549 1.519	
Mean	of	outcome	among	25‐year‐olds	 0.470 0.471	
	
D.	Effect	within	365	days	 0.0108 0.0115*	
	 (0.007) (0.007)	
	
N	within	bandwidth	 105,595 108,338	
Bandwidth	 2.215 2.272	
Mean	of	outcome	among	25‐year‐olds	 0.508 0.510	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	
level.	
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Table	10:	Effects	by	benefit	cut	
	 (1)	 (2) (3) (4)	
	 Benefit	cut	 No	benefit	cut Benefit	cut No	benefit	cut	
	 Threat	effect	 Threat	effect Effect	within	
180	days	
Effect	within	
180	days	
	 	 	
Effect	of	programme		 0.0306**	 0.0186*** 0.0349** 0.0229***	
Eligibility	 (0.014)	 (0.006) (0.016) (0.006)	
	 	 	
N	within	bandwidth	 20,355	 110,939 18,602 124,316	
Bandwidth	 1.811	 1.790 1.688 2.179	
Mean	outcome	
among	25‐year‐olds	 0.307	 0.279	 0.474	 0.366	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	
level.	
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Appendix	A.	Derivation	of	the	results	in	Section	2.1.		
	
To	examine	how	search	effort	is	affected	by	activation	intensity,	and	how	this	effect	varies	
across	types,	equations	(1)‐(3)	in	the	main	text	can	be	rewritten	as		
	
(4) ሺߩ ൅ ݌௨௘ሻܸா ൌ ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ, 1 െ ݈௘൯ ൅ ݌௨௘ܸ௎,		
(5) ሺߩ ൅ ߙݏ௨ ൅ ݌௔௨ሻܸ௎ ൌ ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௨൯ ൅ ߙ௜ݏ௨ܸா ൅ ݌௔௨ܸ஺	
(6) ሺߩ ൅ ߙݏ௔ሻܸ஺ ൌ ݄൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௔ െ ݈௔൯ ൅ ߙ௜ݏ௔ܸா.	
	
The	comparative	statics	with	respect	to	activation	time	are		
(7) డ௏ಲడ௟ೌ ൌ െ݄
ᇱி ൏ 0,	
(8) డ௏ೆడ௟ೌ ൌ
௣ೌೠ
ఘାఈ௦ೠା௣ೌೠ
డ௏ಲ
డ௟ೌ ൏ 0,	
	
where	െ݄ᇱி	 is	 the	 derivative	 of	 the	 utility	 function	with	 respect	 to	 leisure	 time.	 	 The	
individual	 maximizes	 his	 utility	 by	 choosing	 search	 effort,	 taking	 all	 macro‐level	
variables	(such	as	the	job‐finding	rates	ߙ௜)	as	given.		The	first‐order	conditions	are		
	
(9) ݄′ி൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௨൯ ൌ ߙ௜ሾܸா െ ܸ௎ሿ,		
	
(10) ݄′ி൫ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܾ, 1 െ ݏ௔ െ ݈௔൯ ൌ ߙ௜ሾܸா െ ܸ஺ሿ.		
	
	On	 the	 left	 hand	 side	 of	 equations	 (9)	 and	 (10),	 one	 has	 the	marginal	 cost	 of	 search,	
whereas	the	right‐hand	side	captures	the	marginal	benefits	of	search	(the	product	of	the	
job‐finding	rate	and	the	value	of	a	job).	
Search	effort	while	the	individual	is	still	in	open	unemployment	is	determined	by	(9).	
Denote	 the	marginal	 benefit	 of	 search	while	 in	 open	 unemployment	 by	ܤ௎ ൌ ߙ௜ሾܸா െ
ܸ௎ሿ.		We	have		
	
(11) డ஻ೆడ௟ೌ ൌ
ఈడሾ௏ಶି௏ೆሿ	
డ௟ೌ		 ൌ ߙ
௜ ቀ ௣ೠ೐ఘା௣ೠ೐ െ 1ቁ
డ௏ೆ	
డ௟ೌ		 ൐ 0,	
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where	 the	 second	 equality	 follows	 from	 (4).	 That	 is,	 the	marginal	 benefit	 of	 search	 is	
increasing	 in	 the	 intensity	of	activation.	Next,	 let	us	examine	how	this	effect	differs	by	
the	job	arrival	rate	ߙ௜.	Using	(7)	and	(8),	we	have	
	
(12) డ஻ೆడ௟ೌడఈ ൌ ቀ
௣ೠ೐
ఘା௣ೠ೐ െ 1ቁ
డ௏ೆ	
డ௟ೌ		 ൅ ߙ
௜ ቀ ௣ೠ೐ఘା௣ೠ೐ െ 1ቁ
డ
డఈ ቀ
௣ೌೠ
ఘାఈ௦ೠା௣ೌೠ
డ௏ಲ	
డ௟ೌ		ቁ	
ൌ ൬ ݌௨௘ߩ ൅ ݌௨௘ െ 1൰
߲ܸ௎	
߲݈௔		 െ ߙ
௜ ൬ ݌௨௘ߩ ൅ ݌௨௘ െ 1൰
ݏ௨݌௔௨
ሺߩ ൅ ߙݏ௨ ൅ ݌௔௨ሻଶ
߲ܸ஺	
߲݈௔		 .	
		
The	 first	 term	 of	 this	 expression	 is	 positive,	while	 the	 second	 term	 is	 negative.	 To	
determine	the	sign	of		 డ஻ೆడ௟ೌడఈ,	again	using	(8)	and	combining	terms	shows	that	the	above	
expression	can	be	written	as	
	
(13) డ஻డ௟ೌడఈ ൌ ቀ
௣ೠ೐
ఘା௣ೠ೐ െ 1ቁ
௣ೌೠሺఘା௣ೌೠሻ
ሺఘାఈ௦ೠା௣ೌೠሻమ
డ௏ಲ	
డ௟ೌ		 ൐ 0.	
	
Let	us	next	turn	to	benefits	of	search	during	the	actual	activation	phase.	The	marginal	
benefit	of	search,	which	we	denote	by	ܤ஺	in	the	case	of	activation,	is	then	given	by	the	
right‐hand	side	of	(10).	We	have	that	
	
(14) డ஻ಲడ௟ೌ ൌ
ఈడሾ௏ಶି௏ಲሿ	
డ௟ೌ		 ൌ ߙ
௜ ቀ ௣ೠ೐ఘା௣ೠ೐
௣ೌೠ
ఘାఈ௦ೠା௣ೌೠ െ 1ቁ
డ௏ಲ	
డ௟ೌ		 ൐ 0,	
	
where	 the	 latter	 equality	 again	 follows	 from	 (4)	 and	 (8).	 Differentiating	 the	 above	
expression	with	respect	to	ߙ	yields	
	
(15) డ஻ಲడ௟ೌడఈ ൌ ቀ
௣ೠ೐
ఘା௣ೠ೐
௣ೌೠ
ఘାఈ௦ೠା௣ೌೠ െ 1ቁ
డ௏ಲ	
డ௟ೌ		 െ ߙ
ሺఘା௣ೠ೐ሻ௣ೠ೐௣ೌೠ௦ೠ
ሺఘା௣ೠ೐ሻమሺఘାఈ௦ೠା௣ೌೠሻమ
డ௏ಲ	
డ௟ೌ		 ൐ 0.	
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Appendix	B:	Additional	tables	and	figures	
	
	
	
Figure	B.1:	Kaplan‐Meier	survival	estimates	for	unemployment	duration	(upper	panel)	
and	smoothed	hazard	estimates	for	exits	to	employment	(lower	panel)	for	24‐	and	25‐
year‐olds	in	2008	‐	2009.	
Note:	The	individuals	are	divided	into	groups	based	on	their	age	90	days	after	entering	unemployment.	
The	sample	is	limited	to	24‐	and	25‐year‐olds	who	are	born	during		the	same	calendar	year.	
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Figure	B.2:	Kaplan‐Meier	survival	estimates	for	unemployment	duration	for	individuals	
who	used	a	neurological	drug	the	previous	year	(right	panel)	or	did	not	use	such	a	drug	
(left	panel),	2008	‐	2009.	
Note:	The	individuals	are	divided	into	groups	based	on	their	age	90	days	after	entering	unemployment.	
The	sample	is	limited	to	24‐	and	25‐year‐olds	who	are	born	during		the	same	calendar	year.	
 
	
Figure	B.3:	Kaplan‐Meier	survival	estimates	for	unemployment	duration	for	school	
drop‐outs	(right	panel)	and	others	(left	panel),	2008	‐	2009.	
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Note:	The	individuals	are	divided	into	groups	based	on	their	age	90	days	after	entering	unemployment.	
The	sample	is	limited	to	24‐	and	25‐year‐olds	who	are	born	during		the	same	calendar	year.	
	
	
Figure	B.4:	Youth	Job	Guarantee	take‐up	by	quartiles	of	predicted	employment	
probabilities	(among	individuals	whose	unemployment	spell	lasted	longer	than	90	days)	
	
Note:	Age	in	years	relative	to	the	cut‐off	age	25	on	the	x‐axis	and	an	indicator	for	participating	in	the	
programme	on	the	y‐axes.	Age	refers	to	the	individual’s	age	90	days	after	entering	unemployment.	
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	Table	B.1:	Characteristics	of	the	unemployed	by	employment	probability	quartiles		
	 (1) (2) (3) (4)	
	 Quartile	1 Quartile	2 Quartile	3 Quartile	4	
	 	
Country	of	birth,	non‐Nordic	 0.535 0.253 0.123 0.0419	
Has	not	completed	upper	
secondary	school	
0.519 0.176 0.0631 0.0255	
Had	a	neurological	drug 0.246 0.169 0.141 0.0814	
Was	treated	at	a	hospital	 0.411 0.355 0.334 0.292	
Had	more	than	two	medicines	 0.279 0.261 0.274 0.274	
Received	sickness	benefits	 0.0740 0.0931 0.0888 0.0633	
Was	a	psychiatric	patient	 0.117 0.0484 0.0255 0.0101	
Had	a	drug	for	mental	illness	 0.175 0.105 0.0750 0.0358	
Received	disability	pension	 0.0522 0.00330 0.000417 4.77e‐05	
	 	
	
	
Table	B.2:	Fuzzy	RD	estimates	as	a	function	of	bandwidth	
	 Threat	effect Effect	days	1‐180	
Percentage	of		
optimal	bandwidth	
Coef.	 Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.	
10	 5.204332	 29.58232 ‐6.87527 25.17442	
20	 1.212817	 1.830545 0.525073 7.567868	
30	 0.508782	 0.337916 0.330101 0.610102	
40	 0.346634	 0.167781 0.204172 0.231704	
50	 0.284859	 0.108871 0.19177 0.13958	
60	 0.235573	 0.080349 0.183498 0.098318	
70	 0.206274	 0.064248 0.172676 0.075565	
80	 0.189631	 0.054224 0.160803 0.061814	
90	 0.176193	 0.047252 0.156324 0.052678	
100	 0.166565	 0.042047 0.152594 0.046314	
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 Figure	C.2:	Balance	of	background	variables,	quartile	1	
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Figure	C.3:	Balance	of	background	variables,	quartile	2	
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Figure	C.4:	Balance	of	background	variables,	quartile	3.	
 
 
	
	
52
 	
	
Figure	C.5:	Balance	of	background	variables,	quartile	4.	
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Figure	C.6:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	threat	effect	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	quartile	1	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
	
	
	Figure	C.7:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	threat	effect	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	quartile	2	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
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Figure	C.8:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	threat	effect	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	quartile	3	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
	
	
	
Figure	C.9:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	threat	effect	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	quartile	4	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
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	Figure	C.10:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	effect	during	day	1‐180	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	
quartile	1	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
	
	
Figure	C.11:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	effect	during	day	1‐180	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	
quartile	2	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
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	Figure	C.12:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	effect	during	day	1‐180	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	
quartile	3	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
	
	
	Figure	C.13:	The	RD	estimate	of	the	effect	during	day	1‐180	as	a	function	of	bandwidth,	
quartile	4	
Note:	The	vertical	line	marks	the	Imbens‐Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth.	
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	Figure	C.14:	Placebo	tests:	Threat	effect	in	2007,	by	quartiles	
Note:	Age	in	years	relative	to	the	cut‐off	age	25	on	the	x‐axis	and	an	indicator	for	becoming	employed	
during	the	first	90	days	of	unemployment	on	the	y‐axis.	Age	refers	to	the	individual’s	age	90	days	after	
entering	unemployment.	
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Table	C.1:	Estimated	effects	of	being	eligible	for	the	YJG	programme	at	day	90	and	180,	
by	quartiles.	Robustness	to	adding	covariates	
	
	
Threat	effect,	
with	covariates	
Days	1‐180,	with	
covariates	
	
A.	Quartile	1	
	
0.00728	
(0.00723)	
 
0.0137	
(0.00877)		
N	 83,880	 77,763
Bandwidth	 2.101	 2.080
	 	
B.	Quartile	2	 0.0239*	 0.0263*
	 (0.010)	 (0.0118)
N	 83,880	 77,505
Bandwidth	 2.089	 1.819
	 	
C.	Quartile	3	 0.0313**	 0.0287*
	 (0.0102)	 (0.0124)
	
N	 83,880	 77,153
Bandwidth	 2.278	 1.780
	 	
D.	Quartile	4	 0.0293**	 0.0263*
	 (0.00990)	 (0.0118)
N	 83,879	 79,659
Bandwidth	 2.368	 1.768
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	
percent	level.		
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Table	C.2:	Placebo	tests	of	turning	24,	by	quartiles	
	 (1) (2)	
	 Effect	within	90	days Effect	within	180	days
	
A.	Quartile	1	
	
23‐	vs.	24‐year‐olds	 ‐0.00502 0.00165	
	 (0.008) (0.010)	
	
N	 33,395 29,957	
Bandwidth	 1.755 1.702	
	 	
B.	Quartile	2		 	
23‐	vs.	24‐year‐olds	 7.22e‐05 ‐0.00693	
	 (0.011) (0.012)	
	
N	 35,981 33,388	
Bandwidth	 1.819 1.848	
	 	
C.	Quartile	3	 	
23‐	vs.	24‐year‐olds	 ‐0.0158 ‐0.0240**	
	 (0.012) (0.011)	
	
N	 30,752 41,238	
Bandwidth	 1.520 2.204	
	 	
D.	Quartile	4	 	
23‐	vs.	24‐year‐olds	 ‐0.0152 ‐0.00752	
	 (0.011) (0.011)	
	
N	 39,447 36,260	
Bandwidth	 1.914 1.857	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	
defined	by	Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	
significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	level.
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Table	C.3:	Placebo	test	of	turning	26,	by	quartiles	
	 (1) (2)	
	 Effect	within	90	days Effect	within	180	days	
	
A.	Quartile	1	
	
25‐	vs.	26‐year‐olds	 0.00103 ‐0.000107	
	 (0.007) (0.009)	
	
N	 38,590 35,672	
Bandwidth	 2.224 2.230	
	 	
B.	Quartile	2	 	
25‐	vs.	26‐year‐olds	 ‐0.0202* ‐0.0201*	
	 (0.010) (0.012)	
	
N	 34,263 31,016	
Bandwidth	 2.032 2.005	
	 	
C.	Quartile	3	 	
25‐	vs.	26‐year‐olds	 ‐0.00107 0.00865	
	 (0.012) (0.012)	
	
N	 31,612 34,946	
Bandwidth	 1.923 2.322	
	 	
D.	Quartile	4	 	
25‐	vs.	26‐year‐olds	 0.00752 ‐0.00680	
	 (0.012) (0.012)	
	
N	 31,375 29,588	
Bandwidth	 1.777 2.203	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	
as	defined	by	Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	
significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	level.	
	
	
	
61
   
Table	C.4:	Results	using	Calonico	et	al.	(2014)	robust	inference	procedure,	by	quartiles	
	 (1)	 (2) (3) (4)	
	 Quartile	1	 Quartile	2 Quartile	3 Quartile	4	
	 	 	
Effect	within	90	days	 0.00843	 0.0194 0.0252 0.0297	
	 	 	
Conventional	p‐value	 0.253	 0.050 0.015 0.003	
Robust	p‐value	 0.404	 0.976 0.062 0.236	
	 	 	
N	within	bandwidth	 37868	 37868 41629 45574	
Bandwidth	 2.101	 2.089 2.278 2.368	
	 (1)	 (2) (3) (4)	
	 Quartile	1	 Quartile	2 Quartile	3 Quartile	4	
	 	 	
Effect	within	180	days 0.0153	 0.0220 0.0227 0.0280	
	 	 	
Conventional	p‐value	 0.089	 0.070 0.077 0.022	
Robust	p‐value	 0.111	 0.570 0.072 0.087	
	 	 	
N	within	bandwidth	 34552	 30021 29261 31730	
Bandwidth	 2.080	 1.819 1.780 1.768	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	
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Table	C.5:	Robustness	to	changes	in	the	definition	of	employment,	by	quartiles.	
	 (1) (2)	
	 Threat	effect Effect	within	180	
days	
	
A.	Quartile	1	
	
	 	
Baseline	estimates	(Table	5,	Col.	1)	 0.00843 0.0153*	
	 (0.007) (0.009)	
	 	
Estimates	when	New	Start	Jobs	are		
treated	
0.00850 0.0155*	
as	employment	 (0.008) (0.009)	
N	within	bandwidth	 36,630 35,757	
Bandwidth	 2.036 2.149	
	
B.	Quartile	2	
	
	 	
Baseline	estimates	(Table	5,	Col.	2)	 0.0194** 0.0220*	
	 (0.010) (0.012)	
	 	
Estimates	when	New	Start	Jobs	are	
treated	
0.0188* 0.0200	
as	employment	 (0.010) (0.012)	
N	within	bandwidth	 38,492 29,979	
Bandwidth	 2.125 1.817	
	
C.	Quartile	3	
	
	 	
Baseline	estimates	(Table	5,	Col.	3)	 0.0252** 0.0227*	
	 (0.010) (0.013)	
	 	
Estimates	when	New	Start	Jobs	are	
treated	
0.0242** 0.0230*	
as	employment	 (0.010) (0.012)	
N	within	bandwidth	 41,135 31,013	
Bandwidth	 2.251 1.883	
	
D.	Quartile	4	
	
	 	
Baseline	estimates	(Table	5,	Col.	4)	 0.0297*** 0.0280**	
	 (0.010) (0.012)	
	 	
Estimates	when	New	Start	Jobs	are	
treated	
0.0312*** 0.0307**	
as	employment	 (0.010) (0.012)	
N	within	bandwidth	 44,102 31,176	
Bandwidth	 2.295 1.735	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	
by	Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	
percent	level.		
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Table	C.6:	Effects	of	being	eligible	for	the	YJG	programme	by	quartiles	of	employment	
probabilities	for	those	who	faced	no	benefit	cut	
	 (1)	 (2) (3) (4)	
	 Quartile	1	 Quartile	2 Quartile	3 Quartile	4	
	 	 	
A.	Threat	effect	 0.00692	 0.0217** 0.0281** 0.0187	
	 (0.008)	 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)	
	
N	within	bandwidth	 34464	 34148 32197 26391	
Bandwidth	 1.958	 2.062 2.233 1.927	
	 	 	
B.	Effect	in	180	days	 0.0141	 0.0245* 0.0302** 0.0135	
	 (0.009)	 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)	
	
N	within	bandwidth	 33814	 28270 24480 26301	
Bandwidth	 2.080	 1.887 1.921 2.059	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	
percent	level.		
	
	
Table	C.7.	Effects	of	being	eligible	for	the	YJG	programme	by	quartiles	of	employment	
probabilities,	controlling	for	benefit	cut	
	 Threat	effect,	
no	covar.	
(Table	5)	
Threat	effect,
controlling	for	
benefit	cut	
Days	1‐180,	no	
covar.	
(Table	5)	
Days	1‐180,	
controlling	for	
benefit	cut	
	
A.	Quartile	1	
	
0.00843	 0.00820	 0.0153*	
	
0.0147	
	 (0.007)	 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)	
	
N	 83880	 83880 77763 77763	
Bandwidth	 2.101	 2.101 2.080 2.080	
	
B.	Quartile	2	
	
0.0194**	 0.0233**	 0.0220*	
	
0.0259**	
	 (0.010)	 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)	
	
N	 83880	 83880 77505 77505	
Bandwidth	 2.089	 2.089 1.819 1.819	
	 	 	
C.	Quartile	3	 0.0252**	 0.0317*** 0.0227* 0.0281**	
	 (0.010)	 (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)	
	
N	 83880	 83880 77153 77153	
Bandwidth	 2.278	 2.278 1.780 1.780	
	 	 	
D.	Quartile	4	 0.0297***	 0.0296*** 0.0280** 0.0268**	
	 (0.010)	 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)	
	
N	 83879	 83879 79659 79659	
Bandwidth	 2.368	 2.368 1.768 1.768	
Notes:	Estimates	from	local	linear	regressions	using	a	triangle	kernel	and	optimal	bandwidth	as	defined	by	
Imbens‐	Kalyanaraman.	Std	errors	in	parentheses.	*/**/***	denotes	significance	at	the	10/5/1	percent	level.	
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